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AFIT/GEM/ENV/09-M10 
Abstract 
 
Since the recent focus on the Global War on Terror, both military and civilian theorists 
have begun to “relearn” the intricacies of counterinsurgency warfare.  We face difficult 
challenges when confronting non-state actors that tend to attack in the time between 
conventional battles and the establishment of stable governments.  This research 
compares and contrasts current counterinsurgency strategies (Hearts and Minds and Cost 
Benefit Theory) by applying System Dynamics to provide insight into the influences and 
emergent behavior patterns of counterinsurgency systems.  The information gained from 
the development of the models and from their simulation behaviors is used to construct a 
System Dynamics model of a Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy that combines the 
influential elements and behaviors from each of the previous models to obtain a more 
comprehensive model of the counterinsurgency system.  This process yields behavior 
patterns that suggest that security operations, critical during the short-term, are key to 
disrupting insurgent organizational mechanisms that strongly influence the population’s 
support for the host government and the coalition. The models also demonstrate the 
strength of the influence of information operations on the counterinsurgency system.  
Finally, the construction of the models and simulation behaviors propose that harvesting 
host nation capacity throughout the counterinsurgency is the most influential factor for 
maintaining long-term stability.   
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THE HYBRID COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY: SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
EMPLOYED TO DEVELOP BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF JOINT STRATEGY 
 
I.   Introduction 
 
“Our Air Force is essential to that difficult form of warfare that we have had to 
learn, or perhaps I should say relearn, in recent years.  In Afghanistan … 
American airmen are leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams. And many more 
are on the ground helping to do things like build roads and guard facilities and 
support local agriculture.  You have been called to adapt to the demands of 
counterinsurgency.”  
(Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, April 14, 2008) 
 
 
Background 
Even though the United States has been involved in substantially more conflicts 
involving non-state violent actors than nation-states since the end of World War II 
(Barnett, 2004), it has not been until the recent focus on Operations Enduring Freedom 
and Iraqi Freedom that military and civilian theorists have begun to “relearn” the 
intricacies of this type of warfare.  One estimate suggests that more has been written on 
the topic of counterinsurgency in the last four years than in the previous 40 (Kilcullen, 
2008).  Throughout the years these conflicts have been labeled military operations other 
than war, low-intensity conflicts, irregular warfare, and small wars; but the overriding 
principle has been a group of non-state actors fighting for legitimacy and influence over a 
given population (AFDD 2-3, 2007).  While these non-state actors cannot match the 
military power of the United States, leaders of these groups have chosen military tactics 
that often involve low-tech, high-consequence actions that can lead to disastrous levels of 
destruction.  These tactics pose an array of security, military and political challenges that 
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require great adaptability.  Even though conventional forces sponsored by states are 
outmatched by the strengths of the United States military, it faces difficult challenges 
when confronting non-state actors that tend to attack in the time between traditional 
conventional battles and the establishment of stable governments.  The true challenge 
then comes by understanding and fighting within the “seam between war and peace.” 
(Barnett, 2005)  
The question now arises as to how the United States military should focus their 
attention in counterinsurgency conflict.  Many publications on this topic originate from 
reviewing historical examples and drawing conclusion based on case-specific views.  
Even though past lessons provide a vital guide to begin looking at future doctrine, other 
analysis methods are needed to effectively construct counterinsurgency strategy that 
considers complex social system influences.  This research will attempt to compare and 
contrast current counterinsurgency strategies by applying System Dynamics modeling.  
The goal is to construct system models that will provide insight into the emergent 
behavior patterns of system elements.  These building blocks of the system models and 
the influences that tie them together will provide the necessary information to refine the 
models of the strategies studied in order to develop a more robust application of 
counterinsurgency assets.   
 
Problem Statement 
It is apparent that the insurgency process encompasses much too broad of a spectrum to 
discuss and analyze in its entirety.  This section will outline the emergence of the two 
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counterinsurgency strategies that will be studied and provide a foundation for the 
problem definition.   
This research will address the two predominant modern counterinsurgency 
strategies that have been derived from the reasoning of insurgency and counterinsurgency 
theorists.  These strategies are known as Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit Theory.  The 
popularity of these two theories can be attributed, at least in part, to the 
counterinsurgency research conducted since 1958 by RAND Corporation.  Long (2006) 
presented an excellent anthology to the creation of these contrasting strategies.  Hearts 
and Minds focuses counterinsurgency operations on establishing modernization and 
economic development in an effort to increase the local government’s legitimacy and 
gain the popular support away from the insurgents, while maintaining a military posture 
that is mainly designated towards ensuring security.  The most notable implementations 
of this strategy have been the British counterinsurgency strategy during the Malayan 
Emergency (1948 – 1960) and the current strategy in Iraq of Clear-Hold-Build advocated 
by FM 3-24 (2006).  This theory has been greatly supported by the lessons published by 
insurgents and counterinsurgency strategists like Lawrence (1935), Galula (1964), 
Guevara (1969), and Nagl (2002).  Cost Benefit Theory, also known as Coercion, has 
been greatly debated as of late for its contrasting views.  This approach involves the 
“buying” of support and insurgent cooperation though programs directed at obtaining 
intelligence and seeking to disrupt the insurgency by focusing the elements of military 
and political power on their organizational structures.  The premise behind this approach 
is that a population reacts to inputs to the system as rational actors; measuring their 
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actions by considering the costs in relation to the expected outcomes.  The game then 
becomes an effort to shift the balance away from potential benefits for continuing the 
insurgency.  Similarly, this view has been advocated by theorists dating to and inspired 
by the developments of the Vietnam conflict (Zwick, et al., 1964; Leites & Wolf, 1970; 
Popkin; 1979).  Recently the Coercion strategy has taken the form of “buying” the 
insurgent’s cooperation by increased threat of military force and violent retaliation to 
insurgent actions.  One theorist suggested to "out-terrorize the insurgents, so that fear of 
reprisals outweighs the desire to help the insurgents" (Luttwak, 1999).  Another recent 
interpretation of Cost Benefit Theory centers around the premise that the insurgent 
leaders and supporters can be “bought” through focused attention on amnesty and reward 
programs (Kahl, 2007) or by rehabilitation efforts that place them back into a legitimate 
governmental structure (Nagl, 2008).    
 
Research Objective 
There are three primary research objectives that will be addressed throughout this study.  
The first is to attempt to consolidate the significant counterinsurgency knowledge that has 
been generated by insurgent leaders and counterinsurgency experts throughout a wide 
range of time and geographic regions.  These lessons will be used to guide the 
development of the system models and to provide context for their discussions.  The 
second objective is to build System Dynamics models of the Hearts and Minds and Cost 
Benefit Theory strategies.  These models will be generated incrementally; following the 
phases of assessing natural behavior, developing influence and flow diagrams, and 
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modularly testing and validating the system construction.  The insight gained from the 
development of the models and from their simulated behaviors will then be utilized for 
the completion of the third objective.  This research objective will construct a System 
Dynamics model of a Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model by combining the 
influential elements and behaviors from each of the previous models in order to obtain a 
more comprehensive model of the counterinsurgency system.   
 
Methodology 
Much of the knowledge that exists on counterinsurgency is derived from case studies of 
past engagements.  Modeling and simulation techniques can be employed to provide a 
more complete picture from which strategy can be developed.  Even though other 
modeling techniques, such as effects-based operations and value focused thinking, have 
been used to describe insurgency, terrorism, and counterinsurgency problems, these are 
not designed to conform to the nature of complex social systems.  System Dynamics 
takes a different approach than the previously mentioned techniques by not basing the 
analysis on empirical data, but focusing on developing system structures by observing 
individual components’ basic behavior patterns.  This foundational emphasis on system 
structure allows a System Dynamics model to rely on system influences more than on 
abstract formulas or case-specific data.  This technique has been greatly used since its 
introduction by Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Jay Forrester in the 
1960s and been applied to modeling problems in the areas of natural sciences, public 
management, business processes, and insurgencies (Sterman, 2000).   
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II.  Literature Review 
 
This chapter will include an extensive summary of the thinking on counterinsurgency 
strategy.  This section will begin with a look at the employment of insurgency tactics 
from the perspective of historical revolutionary figures.  This will be followed by classic 
counterinsurgency lessons posed by combatants and theorists.  Then, current 
counterinsurgency doctrine will be summarized and placed into the historical frameworks 
from which they were developed.  Finally, an examination of recent counterinsurgency 
research conducted through the application of simulation and modeling techniques 
towards counterinsurgency, insurgencies, and terrorism will be outlined.  It is the goal of 
this chapter to examine these counterinsurgency philosophies, lessons learned, doctrine, 
and research that will serves as a foundation for the development of the key system 
elements that will be employed further in this research process.   
 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Strategies  
A summary of the classic insurgency and counterinsurgency lessons explored for this 
research are demonstrated in Figure 1.  The graphic depicts the range of geographic 
regions and historical timelines studied.  This is not to say that these cases are inclusive 
of the all lessons learned for developing effective counterinsurgency strategy, but this 
array has been selected due to the influence of the theories and their special and temporal 
diversity.  The discussion of these strategies, lessons, and doctrine will attempt to 
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summarize the historical framework and identify the overlap and distinctions in their 
perspectives.   
 
Figure 1: Map and timescale of classic counterinsurgency theories and modern 
counterinsurgency applications used for this study 
 
The first major contributor to the classical study of insurgencies was British Lieutenant 
Colonel T. E. Lawrence’s experiences as part of the British military advisory to the Arab 
rebels fighting the Turkish Ottoman Empire (1916 – 1919).  Lawrence, schooled in the 
traditional military teachings of Napoleon and Clausewitz, began to see revolution as a 
completely different endeavor.  Before, he thought of victory as defined by the 
destruction of enemy forces.  But, as Lawrence (1935) accounts, even though the 
rebellion had never defeated the Turkish army in open combat, they controlled a vast 
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majority of the territory and employed their limited resources in the most effective ways 
by attacking the larger army’s weaknesses.   
 When Lawrence’s approach is considered in the framework of modern 
insurgency, his methodology can be defined as a Military Focus strategy (O’Neill, 2001).  
In this structure, the insurgent force, Lawrence’s Arab Bedouin, maintained a 
conventional military mindset while striking only when the situation was to their 
advantage.  At this pace they could transition into more traditional tactics as the will of 
the Turkish forces was degraded through the asymmetric struggle.  This approach is 
common to many occurrences of civil war, such as those in the United States (1861 – 
1865) and in Nigeria (1967 – 1970).   
 Lawrence’s contributions stem from the development several principals he 
thought were characteristic of revolutionary conflict.  He suggested that the army against 
which the rebellion was being waged must be technologically advanced, and thus 
dependant on their technology.  It must also be large enough to restrict their movement 
but not too large that they could easily control vast amounts of terrain.  He also proposed 
that an insurgent force must hold a base of operations that is outside of the reach of the 
opposition and among the people from which they can gather support and supplies.  On 
the topic of support, Lawrence states that the insurgency must count on at least some 
degree of passive support, if not their full involvement.  He also estimates that the 
fighting proportion of the local population supporting the insurgency needs to only be 
about two percent (Lawrence, 1920; Schneider, 2005).  Many that will follow Lawrence 
as classic revolutionary thinkers will draw on his ideas and methods to define their own 
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situations.  But, shortly after that time period another rebellion was underway that 
contrasted Lawrence’s theories and shaped the fundamental purpose of many revolutions 
that followed.   
 From 1917 – 1924, Vladimir Lenin lead a starkly different sort of insurgency to 
seize control of modern-day Russia.  Lenin’s conspiratorial strategy sought to expel the 
existing government by using outsiders to the ruling elite that held key roles within the 
government and could mass military, political, and social support (O’Neill, 2001).  Even 
though this type of revolution does not generally involve conventional or guerilla-scale 
combat, it is a widely employed form of insurgency that holds the same aim of 
overthrowing the current regime or forcing social reform.  Lenin drew as conclusions 
from his rebellion that social, political, and economic discontent are necessary 
preconditions to begin a revolutionary movement.  He also stated that if the movement 
was to be successful, it must be framed around an organized and conventional political 
party – in his case Marxism.  What Lenin failed to realize, or admit in his descriptions of 
the factors that lead to the revolution, was that the existing government was in such a 
state of disorder that it would have most likely fallen to any sort of organized opposition.  
In the years leading up to Lenin’s revolution, the Romanov czarist regime had suffered 
due to their ineffective and unjust governance,  the perception of widespread corruption, 
and an overall discontent from the widely unpopular Russian involvement in World War 
I (O’Neill, 2001).  These preconditions existed independently of Lenin’s revolutionary 
plans and lead others who believed in Lenin’s social reforms to take different approaches; 
most notably Mao Tse-tung in China and Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Cuba.   
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 Mao Tse-tung lead the Chinese revolution in China from 1945 – 1954 and was 
appointed the first Chairman of the People’s Republic of China from 1954 – 1959.  Mao 
institutionalized the insurgent strategy of the Protracted Popular War.  This approach 
focuses on establishing prolonged levels of low-intensity military strikes on government 
targets, while eventually evolving into a fully conventional military force that can defeat 
the opposition’s army in conventional battle.  Mao’s rebellion is one of the most studied 
by scholars on insurgency and irregular warfare.  His recommendations also focused on 
many of the lessons of preceding revolutions.  Mao suggested that the main component of 
a revolution was to target the rural, oppressed, working class.  Their involvement, as 
fighters and supporters, would define the pace of the insurgency through the phases 
described previously.  He also proposed that strong leadership that is guided by political 
principals (Marxism-Leninism) was also paramount.  Finally, Mao gave great credence to 
the belief that an armed revolution would need to transition to a conventional force in 
order to achieve victory (Galula, 1964).  This tactic has been applied in similar manner 
by the North Vietnamese (1959 – 1975), Algerians (1954 – 1962), and most recently by 
Moqtada al Sadr’s militants in Iraq (2004 – present) (FM 3-24, 2006).  Retired US Army 
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl (2002), a widely regarded counterinsurgency expert, 
suggests that Mao’s greatest contribution to irregular warfare was recognizing that a 
rebellion must consider paramount the interdependence of the military and political 
components, along with the support of the populace.  Even though Lawrence previously 
mentioned the importance of popular involvement and Lenin gave great weight to the 
need for politically and socially driven organization, neither connected the interrelation of 
these efforts into the same strategy.   
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 Another Marxist-Leninist focused insurgency was organized in Cuba (1956 – 
1967) by the Argentinean revolutionary Che Guevara and the would-be Cuban dictator 
Fidel Castro.  Guevara, who also led revolutionary movements in Congo and Bolivia, 
employed a Military Focus strategy (O’Neill, 2001).  But unlike Lawrence, Guevara drew 
on the Socialist movement for support and used Mao’s interdependent factors (military, 
political, and social) as the foundation for his actions.  Guevara, who came from a well 
educated, upper-middle class upbringing, wrote extensively about his theories.  From his 
writings three main mechanisms that he believed led to his success in the Cuban 
Revolution can be identified:  popular forces can triumph over an unpopular conventional 
army; not all preconditions for a revolution need to be in place, they can be motivated by 
the rebellion; and the rural countryside is the basic arena in which to conduct guerilla 
warfare (Guevara, 1969).   
 Guevara and others have seemed to point out, time and again, that a popular 
insurgent movement can wage and win a decisive victory in irregular warfare; contrary to 
classic conventional strategy proposed by Clausewitz, who stated that wars by an armed 
populace could only serve as a defensive measure (FM 3-24, 2006).  These historical 
examples from the perspective of different insurgency strategies provide great insight 
into viewing irregular conflicts from this lens.  Equally important, is to study the lessons 
learned from the early counterinsurgents who faced these strategies.  This perspective 
allows modern theorists and strategists to draw more direct corollaries to current and 
future counterinsurgency applications.   
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 David Galula (1964), experiencing this type of conflict from the perspective of 
the counterinsurgent, provides one of the first perspectives in irregular warfare from this 
vantage point.  Galula was a French Lieutenant Colonel that fought the Algerian 
secessionist insurgency from 1954 – 1962.  The Algerian-Arab nationalists sought 
independence from French colonial rule and followed Mao Tse-tung’s Protracted Popular 
War doctrine (O’Neill, 2001).  Unlike in China, the Algerian insurgents were not able to 
make the transition to a conventional force in order to complete the cycle outlined by 
Mao and the Protracted Popular War strategy.  Instead, they were able to adapt to this 
limitation and focus on the strategic stalemate phase where they engaged in guerilla 
attacks in an effort to frustrate the government forces, gained widespread popular 
support, and exploited French mistakes through propaganda campaigns (FM 3-24, 2006). 
Galula suggests that popular support is as important to the counterinsurgent as it 
is to the insurgency.  Like the insurgents, the counterinsurgent may also rely on logistical 
and active support from the population, but other factors such as intelligence gathering 
and cutting off safe-havens for the insurgents also become increasingly necessary.  
Galula (1964) regarded the counterinsurgent’s use of popular support as needing to 
leverage the active minority in order to influence the neutral majority and defeat the 
hostile minority.  This is the first instance in which a strategist defined a population in 
terms of their support and their relative composition.  FM 3-24 (2006) echoes that 
thought, defining the population as being comprised of a small insurgent portion, or a 
sector of the population that supports the insurgency, a slightly larger portion of the 
populace that supports the local government, and a majority that is passive or neutral.  
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Galula finally proposes that popular support is conditional and can be gained and lost 
relative to the actions taken (Galula, 1964).  This factor may not be a revelation to many 
who read it, but the fact that none prior to Galula had identified this point is a matter of 
concern.  Following this aspect of Galula’s theory would require insurgents and 
counterinsurgents to modify their tactic based on their perceived level of popular support 
in an effort to not lose what has already been gained. 
 Another important aspect from Galula’s approach was his identification that a 
counterinsurgency must be waged from a primarily political perspective.  He estimated 
that counterinsurgency is comprised of approximately 20 percent military and 80 percent 
politics (Galula, 1964).  Again, this is a deviation from past traditional theories that 
focused on combating an insurgency with a conventional military force and adapting that 
force to fit a guerilla environment.  As insurgents such as Mao Tse-tung have pointed out, 
the elements of military, political, and social power are indispensable for an insurgency 
to succeed; Galula draws on his experience to make the same parallel for the 
counterinsurgent.   
Sir Robert Thompson, a British Lieutenant Colonel, provided many lessons from 
such an example during the British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya from 1948 – 
1960.  The Malayan Emergency was started by the local Communist party looking to take 
control from the British colonial government following the withdrawal of the Japanese 
force after World War II (Nagl, 2002).  The insurgency in Malaya, like those of China 
and Algeria, followed Mao’s Protracted Popular War strategy and was focused in the 
rural areas of the country that allowed for insurgent training, organization, and supply 
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(O’Neill, 2001).  Thompson sought to bring all elements of counterinsurgency power into 
the fight: military, economic, and political.  Like Galula, he recognized that a single 
approach would not yield victory because the insurgents were exploiting every 
vulnerability possible.  The Malayan counterinsurgency also employed civic action teams 
that led reconstruction, economic development, and spread governance throughout rural 
areas.  Thompson also sought to cut off the insurgents from the populace by recognizing 
that they could hide within the rural areas, thus targeting these for government-led 
development.  He established an “oil spot” strategy, where development took place in 
central locations that were cleared of insurgent presence and then improved by 
reconstruction, the introduction of jobs, and an increase in commerce (Thompson, 1970).  
This “oil spot” approach is also used in today’s Global War on Terror; for example, the 
establishment of Afghan Development Zones led by Provincial Reconstruction in 
Afghanistan and the Clear-Hold-Build doctrine in Iraq (FM 3-24, 2006).   
 Many have used Malaya as a case study for modern counterinsurgency operations.  
Nagl (2002) drew comparisons from Malaya to critique the American military 
counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam.  He proposed that the US military did not adapt to 
the environment of irregular warfare in the same ways the British did and that this was 
the deciding factor in US failure to control the North Vietnamese insurgency.  While the 
British tailored their operations to their perceptions of the population’s level of support, 
the American military did not embrace this tactic and relied on more conventional, 
effects-based targeting to conduct their operations.  The case of Vietnam also added 
additional domestic political considerations, such as an increasing rate of demonstrations 
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against the conflict and the added involvement of non-military government officials in 
direct operational planning, that further plagued the US efforts.   
 This section has provided a synopsis of the development of insurgency strategies 
and the lessons learned from counterinsurgency efforts to combat these conflicts.  The 
following will introduce and discuss the development of current counterinsurgency 
strategies that have emerged from the observation of insurgency theorists and past 
lessons. 
 
Emergent Counterinsurgency Theories 
To “win the hearts and minds of the people” was a term first used by Sir Gerald Templar 
during the Malayan Emergency to describe the British counterinsurgency approach of 
gaining popular support through security, reconstruction, economic development, and 
governance.  During the period of the 1960s, what has come to be known as the Hearts 
and Minds theory dominated the efforts to define counterinsurgency doctrine, especially 
within the US military and research institutions, such as RAND Corporation.  The goal of 
this theory is to restore governance and order by gaining popular support for the host 
nation government.  The premise behind this doctrine is that economic instability and the 
insurgent’s ability to gain popular support were the key elements that caused 
counterinsurgencies to fail in historical examples.  Kahl (2007), in reviewing FM 3-24 for 
Foreign Affairs, discussed the validity of Hearts and Minds as a clear representation of 
modern counterinsurgency efforts learning from lessons of the past.   
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As the discussion of classic insurgent strategies pointed out, the focus on popular 
support has been a largely dominant element of this debate.  Thus, the main elements that 
drive Hearts and Minds doctrine are those surrounding the gaining and maintaining of 
popular support.  Galula (1964) said that “military action is second to political” and 
Hearts and Minds echoes that view by driving its main military effort towards 
establishing security around areas where stability and the rule of law can be promoted 
and propagated.  Here Combat Operations shares an equal role alongside developing Host 
Nation Security Forces, providing Essential Services, establishing good Governance and 
Justice, and fostering Economic Development.  All of these components are encompassed 
under an umbrella of Information Operations aimed at countering the propaganda spread 
by insurgents and broadening the reach of the host nation government and its 
achievements (FM 3-24, 2006). 
These key elements of Hearts and Minds are outlined in FM 3-24 (2006), in what 
the field manual refers to as logical lines of operation.  Combat Operations are aimed at 
securing the local populace and national borders, separating the insurgency from the 
population, and identifying and neutralizing insurgent structures.  These functions are to 
be conducted by integrating with the Host Nation Security Forces in an effort to train and 
equip these elements of the local government and transition security responsibilities to 
them as the situations arise.  Notice that the focus is on promoting the host nation 
government and securing the population, not on kinetic maneuvers that come to mind 
when discussing combat operations in a conventional framework.  The goal with 
developing these Host Nation Security Forces is to build, train, and equip a resilient and 
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stable security arm of the host nation that possesses strong leadership, adequate facilities, 
and are trained in planning and executing security operations.  In the area of Essential 
Services, a direct parallel to the civic action programs Thompson described as having 
contributed greatly during the Malayan Emergency, the aim is to repair or establish 
critical infrastructure; such as transportation, water, and electricity.  Other factors for 
development are waste and sewage, schools, medical clinics, and public offices.  The 
Governance component of Hearts and Minds strategy seeks to gain legitimacy for the 
host nation leadership by developing government planning for services and 
administration, establishing the reach of the government throughout regional and 
provincial areas, and instituting judicial order in-line with local culture.  Finally, 
Economic Development is intended to support free market initiatives, repair commercial 
infrastructure, and stimulate the workforce through skills-development programs and the 
employment of local contractors for reconstruction projects.  The strategy also articulates 
the need to align these key components around a robust Information Operations plan.  
This factor is imperative in gaining information for the use of vital intelligence, 
countering information to quell propaganda spread through insurgent networks, and 
exploiting information that will boost the perception of host nation government 
legitimacy (FM 3-24, 2006).   
Nagl (2002) described “dollars” as the new bullets in the counterinsurgency fight.  
He proposed that Hearts and Minds are directly targeted through programs like the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which is aimed at providing 
reconstruction, introducing skilled workforce, and promoting economic development.  
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The rationale is that these elements will help gain credibility for the host nation 
government and shift support away from the insurgents, who are not capable of providing 
these types of social and economic improvements.  An increase in popular support should 
also directly affect the quantity and quality of intelligence gained from the populace 
(Human Intelligence, or HUMINT).  Finally, Nagl also suggests that focusing on the 
Hearts and Minds is all but impossible if the Host Nation Security Forces are not 
effectively trained and equipped to protect the populace.  The perception that the host 
nation, and not outside supporters, is providing the security and services is paramount to 
gaining and maintaining the necessary support.   
But, not all strategists subscribe to the utility of popular support and economic 
development as the deciding factors of a counterinsurgency.   The Cost Benefit Theory of 
counterinsurgency, also known as Coercion, emerged in opposition to the premises of 
Hearts and Minds.  This provided the first view of insurgencies and counterinsurgency as 
a complex system to which known econometric analysis tools could be applied.  The 
developers of this strategy, RAND economists Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., 
proposed that counterinsurgency should be less focused on gaining intangible measures, 
such as popular support, and more about raising the costs associated with waging the 
insurgency, thus ensuring that these costs would not provide an acceptable balance of 
prospective benefits (Kahl, 2007).   
 The fundamental notion behind Cost Benefit Theory is that insurgencies can be 
treated as systems and that the aim of counterinsurgency is to reduce their effectiveness 
by raising the costs associated with insurgent actions.  The proponents of this approach 
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also suggested that a population reacts to inputs to the system as rational actors; 
measuring their actions by considering the costs in relation to the expected outcomes.  
They also stipulated that irrational behaviors where caused by misinformation or 
inadequate execution of cost-control triggers.  Finally, they proposed that measurable 
actions, such as acts of violence or terrorism, where more important evaluation factors 
than attitudes, such as the perception of popular support or government legitimacy that 
Hearts and Minds suggests (Long, 2006).  The authors of this doctrine where intrigued by 
the difficulty in measuring and analyzing counterinsurgency when compared to other 
military analyses, such as nuclear doctrine.  They questioned why military theorists could 
struggle so much with a counterinsurgency system that provide a wealth of historic 
examples and could be modeled using proven techniques, while tactics and procedures 
for nuclear conflict were very detailed and highly agreed-upon even though they lacked 
case data (Leites & Wolf, 1970).  It can be speculated that perhaps this reasoning lead to 
their selection of measurable factors as being fundamental to their theory in order to 
develop analysis models. 
 Leites and Wolf (1970) describe what they believed were the factors that 
contributed to their “alternative proposal”.  From their discussion, factors such as 
Impeding Inputs to the Insurgency, Destroying Outputs of the Insurgency, Building Host 
Nation Authority Structure, Intelligence and Information, and Population Behavior can be 
extracted as being foundational.  When considering Population Behavior, this strategy 
defines their actions as being based more on opportunities and the costs associated with 
making choices (supply) rather than needs and wants (demand).  It is also suggested that 
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affiliation, a term which may be interpreted as behavior in support of the insurgency or 
the government, is determined by the progress each side has demonstrated.   
 Even though the majority of the elements of Cost Benefit Theory have been 
derived from the work of Leites and Wolf, others have followed with supporting 
arguments.  Farmer (1964), another RAND researcher, proposed that economic 
development, as one of the characteristics of a successful strategy, may act to improve 
support for the populace, but support in itself is not the required outcome.  Cost Benefit 
Theory differs slightly from Farmer’s view in that it advises that economic development 
may not be an adequate input to the system because it has equal opportunity to aid the 
insurgents; through resources and services that can be taken from the populace or even 
given directly to insurgent supporters (Leites & Wolf, 1970).  More recently some have 
suggested that the Cost Benefit Theory can be taken to the level of “out-terrorize the 
terrorist”, in which the host nation government and the supporting forces are able to 
instill a sense of fear into the insurgent supporters to a degree where they no longer wish 
to support the revolution because of the threat of retaliation (Luttwack, 1999).  Peters 
(2006) has also criticized the application of the “hearts and minds myth” in Iraq.  He 
states that even though gaining popular and international support are satisfactory 
outcomes, the key elements to preserving national security are national respect and a 
feared military.  
In an effort to extract commonalities from the strategies presented, Table 1 
summarizes the theorists studied, their particular time period, location, insurgency theory 
used or witnessed, and the lessons generated from their experiences.  Table 1 also 
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includes the characteristics of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 
as they pertain to the discussion of the theories presented.   
An important similarity identified is the mention of some form of popular support; 
the range of this spans Lenin’s implication that the revolution must be tied to social 
reform, and it would be expected that this reform revolves around a popular belief, to 
Mao’s reliance on the working class populace as the foundation for an insurgency.  This 
element is expanded by Galula and Thompson from the viewpoint of counterinsurgents in 
that they must also vie for achieving some level of support.  This focus proves to be the 
instrumental factor leading to the development and use of Heart and Minds.   Another key 
observation is the understanding that this sort of irregular conflict involves more than just 
military components; social, political, economic, and informational elements have been 
granted much greater authority during a counterinsurgency campaign when compared to 
a conventional conflict.   
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Table 1: Table of classic theorists, time, location, insurgent strategies employed or faced, 
and methods or lessons contributed to the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency. 
Theorist 
(Who) 
Timeline 
(When) 
Location  
(Where) 
Strategy 
(What) 
Lessons/Methods 
(How) 
T.E. 
Lawrence 
1916 - 1919 Saudi Arabia  Military Focus 
 Unassailable base 
 Exploit enemy’s 
technological dependence 
 Out-maneuver larger enemy 
 At least passive popular 
support 
 Sufficient weaponry 
Vladimir 
Lenin 
1917 - 1924 Russia Conspiratorial 
 Lead by influential outsiders  
 Social, economic, political 
discontent pre-requirement 
 Framed around Marxist 
values 
Mao Tse-tung  1945 - 1954 China 
Protracted 
Popular War 
 Strong involvement of 
working class 
 Leadership guided by 
political reform 
 Evolve from guerilla to 
conventional 
 Interdependence of military, 
government, populace 
Robert 
Thompson 
1948 - 1960 Malaya 
Hearts and 
Minds 
 Must address all facets of 
insurgency 
 Civic action teams 
 Cut-off insurgents from 
populace 
 “Oil spot” approach 
David Galula 1954 - 1962 Algeria 
Hearts and 
Minds 
 Popular support  important 
for COIN 
 Leverage active minority 
 Popular support conditional 
Ernesto 
Guevara 
1956 - 1967 
Cuba, Congo, 
Bolivia 
Military Focus 
 Popular forces can defeat 
conventional army 
 Not all preconditions for 
rebellion required 
 Rural areas stage for guerilla 
combat 
Nathan Leites 
& Charles 
Wolf 
1959 - 1975 Vietnam Cost Benefit 
 Raise costs of insurgency 
 Guided my measurable 
actions 
 Attack inputs to insurgency  
FM 3-24 2001 - Present Iraq, Afghanistan  
Hearts and 
Minds 
 Clear-Hold-Build 
 Focus on Neutral/Passive 
population 
 
Modeling and Simulating Counterinsurgency 
Modeling research geared towards insurgency and terrorism has taken on many forms.  
This section will discuss several of those techniques and provide a framework for the 
development of a technique that will be useful to meet the goal of this research.   
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 An example of a modeling technique applied to insurgencies is called effects-
based operations.  Here, the development of network flows and risk analysis has been 
used to identify nodes of interests or centers of gravity in the insurgent networks and to 
determine optimal courses of action for counterinsurgent forces (Umstead, 2005).  This 
particular study, like many other operational research methods in insurgency and military 
simulation, focuses on political, economic, social, infrastructure, and information system 
factors.  Another methodology that has been used is that of influence node analysis.  This 
tool provides decision makers with a graphical representation of causal relationships 
between system actions or events and probabilistic regressions that can predict outcomes 
(Fatur, 2005).  A variant methodology is termed Bayesian network analysis and is used to 
develop qualitative knowledge and probabilistic estimates of system behaviors based on 
expert input (Faizen & Priest, 2004).  Social networks have also been applied to national 
stability analysis by combining simulation techniques with social interactions within the 
studied systems.  Here social interactions and interconnections are identified and modeled 
in order to exploit these relationships and predict their behaviors (Renfro & Dekro, 
2003).  Other techniques have also been applied to the study of counterinsurgency, 
examples such as game theory (Pate-Cornell & Guikema, 2002) and value focused 
thinking (Pruitt, 2003), have presented alternative to aid decision makers in 
understanding these complex systems.   
 One modeling technique that has been very effective at simulating complex social 
systems, such as a counterinsurgency, and that requires very little empirical data is 
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System Dynamics.  This method has been applied to modeling problems in the areas of 
natural sciences, public management, business processes, and insurgencies.   
In the area of System Dynamics modeling, the first attempt to model 
counterinsurgency warfare came from R. G. Coyle (1985).  He employed a generalized 
view of insurgencies based on literature from Galula, Thompson, Guevara, and others.  
He decided to not focus on a single scenario, such as Algeria or Malaya, for developing 
his system model because he thought that there was sufficient variety of information 
provided from different times and locations that a generalized view could be constructed 
into a useful model.  What he did not incorporate was any prevailing strategy.  When 
Coyle constructed his model, he did so in a gradual approach that allowed the reader to 
follow his logic in establishing influences.  He then identified the closed influence 
feedback loops that governed the systems (persuasion, logistics, and compulsion loops) 
and determined which and how these components where influenced by each other in the 
system.  Coyle used his model to propose policy options, which, based on the model 
influences, would provide insight into this complex social system.  This study provides 
an excellent starting point for future study, because it demonstrates the applicability of 
this method towards the study of counterinsurgency.  The methodology was limited in 
that the model was not simulated mathematically to study emergent behavior patterns of 
the system components or to determine how much government political and social 
support would affect insurgent strength, for example.  Surprisingly, the study has not 
been referenced by any of the subsequent System Dynamics efforts discussed in the 
remainder of this section.   
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The next application of System Dynamics in counterinsurgency research did not 
occur for another twenty years.  This hiatus comes in time when the Cold War and 
Network Centric Operations dominated military thinking and the Pentagon would rather 
forget about being involved in another Vietnam (Barnett, 2005), and it is not until the US 
launches the Global War on Terrorism that this scenario begins to receive further 
scrutiny.  Among the efforts to study counterinsurgency that emerged during this time 
was a new-found focus on the applicability of System Dynamics towards irregular 
warfare. One such study, that originated from the Naval Postgraduate School, focused on 
counterinsurgency by evaluating the US military involvement in fighting Middle Eastern 
terrorist groups (Alcantara et al., 2005).  The research considered policy interactions and 
how the influences within the system affected component behavior.  In contrast to Coyle, 
this study was able to bridge the gap between conceiving influences and observing 
behavior by actually simulating the model.  Their simulated model included relations 
between the US military involvement in the Middle East, the behavior of the terrorist 
groups, and the US allocation of resources to the Global War on Terrorism.  Even though 
their counterinsurgency background addressed classic philosophies, they failed to include 
vital characteristics into their system model; host nation capabilities, popular support, and 
economic development were all lacking.  The construction of the initial influence model 
also did not address why influences where selected and how strong and to what degree 
these influences controlled the system.  This methodology could be applied in future 
work by considering basic system behavioral structures (Sterman, 2000) or classical 
component archetypes (Senge, 1990). 
 
26 
 
Shortly after the thesis by Alcantara et al. was completed, an article appeared in 
Parameters, the publication from the US Army War College, which addressed some of 
these concerns.  Although Baker (2006) may not have heard of the work by Alcantara et 
al., he began his look at counterinsurgency by discussing the system structures and basic 
archetypes that might lead him towards an effective model.  This study was also of 
interest because it developed an influence model based on current counterinsurgency 
doctrine and included characteristics like popular support, security, intelligence, and local 
government legitimacy.  He also built the model gradually so as to rationalize the 
influences and maintain an appropriate level of strategic focus.  Correctly aggregating 
system components allows only the major contributors to influence the system and keeps 
the model developer from adding far more detail than necessary for the analysis.  Again, 
the major limitation of this study was not viewing the system’s behavior through 
simulation.   
The counterinsurgency philosophies and doctrine discussed in this chapter will 
serves as a foundation for the development of the key system elements that will be 
employed in the analysis.  The next chapter will introduce the elements of System 
Dynamics and further explore its viability as an instrument to model complex social 
systems.  The section will also demonstrate the development of the System Dynamics 
models throughout their stages in an effort to logically and iteratively assemble the final 
products, incorporating the elements of the counterinsurgency systems explored from this 
literature review.   
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III.  Methods 
 
This chapter will introduce the concepts of System Dynamics and the methodology 
employed in this study.  First, the following sections will describe the fundamentals of 
System Dynamics modeling and introduce the terminology that will be used throughout 
this research.  This section will outline and discuss the nature of the feedback loops that 
are present in dynamic systems and the construction of the various diagrams that will be 
used to model the system behavior.  Finally, the methodology for sequentially and 
iteratively constructing System Dynamics models will be summarized.  
The first concept that will be introduced is that of the reference mode.  The 
reference mode is the notional representation of basic system behavior patterns over time.  
For example, a population system may initially grow slowly as it is faced with its 
environment, then begin to more rapidly grow as it begins to adapt, and then reach a 
steady state as it is limited by resources or other constraints.   When a complex system, 
like a population, is observed in this natural state where exogenous influences are not 
considered, the natural behavior can be observed and its reference mode pattern can be 
constructed.   
 The reference modes can take one of several basic functions.  As seen with the 
previous example, if the growth of a population were plotted over time, an S-Shaped 
curve would be expected.  Similarly, systems can take on the form of a Goal Seeking or 
Oscillating pattern.  Some of the common reference mode diagrams are seen in Figure 2.  
 
28 
 
 
Figure 2: Common Reference Mode Diagrams, from Sterman (2000). 
 
 In all systems, a set of feedback loops work to reinforce or compensate the actions 
within the system.  In the case of a Reinforcing Loop, an action sets in motion a reaction 
that escalates the original action.  Several simple examples of this phenomenon are funds 
growing in a bank account as interest compounds or a snow ball rolling down hill and 
increasing in size.  On the other hand, a Compensating Loop works to balance the system 
behavior and keep an action from intensifying.   
 As a matter of example, the Popular Support variable that will be a central part of 
the Hearts and Minds model will be analyzed in this manner.  First, the reference mode 
for the variable is considered.  When Popular Support is examined as a stand-alone 
entity, it is intuitive to suggest that its natural behavior will cause a drain in support for 
the insurgency or counterinsurgency over time until all of the support is dissipated.  This 
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1st Order Draining nature is only observed in a theoretical sense because of the definition 
of the  reference mode that no other aspects of the system are influencing it; in other 
words, the government, insurgency, or a coalition force are not acting to influence 
support one way or another.  Thus the reference mode of this natural behavior can be 
represented by the graphic in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Reference Mode Diagram of Natural Behavior of Popular Support in the Hearts 
and Minds model. 
 
For this reference mode diagram, a particular influence diagram is defined that relates to 
this behavior.  An influence diagram illustrates a combination of system elements and 
their relations to one another.  In the case of the Popular Support variable as applied to 
the Heart and Minds model, the influence diagram is demonstrated in Figure 4.  The 
generic 1st Order Draining Structure shows the compensating behavior that is inherent in 
this structure. 
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Figure 4: Influence Diagram of Natural Behavior of Popular Support in Hearts and 
Minds model. 
 
During the model’s construction, the procedure for developing the reference mode and 
influence diagrams would continue for each system element.  This process would 
continue to follow the intuitive approach of designating the natural component behavior 
that best matches the characteristics of the given variable and associating this behavior 
with a known influence.   At this point the system can begin to take shape as individual 
elements are connected to reveal reinforcing or compensating loops that have formed 
from the composition of the system.   
Following the convention of iterative and sequential construction, when the model 
is ready to be operationalized mathematically, the system elements are then constructed 
individually in order to validate natural system behavior and then connected 
incrementally.  The influence diagrams are operationalized into flow diagrams where 
stocks and flows are explicitly identified.  A stock is a model state variable that has an 
accumulating or draining value over time as influenced by its associated inflows and 
outflows.   
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In the current example, Popular Support is the stock that is influenced by the flow 
of Drain on Support.  The remaining element identified in the flow diagram, the Popular 
Support Flow Factor, serves as parameters to physically constrain the model to the limits 
envisioned in the development of the reference mode and influence diagram and to serves 
as a converter or coefficients that links other potential influences together.  The flow 
diagram and model behavior associated with the Popular Support element are shown in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5:  Flow Diagram and behavior of Popular Support in Hearts and Minds model 
simulated in STELLA 9. 
 
Now the system can begin to interact among all of the elements that would be taken to 
the flow diagram stage.  This step of sequentially connecting system elements, as with all 
other steps, is done incrementally, and the behavior is observed after each step in order to 
validate the system structure as the model is constructed.  This emergent behavior is 
compared to the assumed behavior pattern hypothesized after the influence diagrams for 
each element are connected to complete system.  Unexpected behavior can lead to the 
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detection of flaws in the model or to the realization of true system behavior that provides 
better insight into the system’s behavior.   
Thus far the model has been constructed in a systematic manner by starting with a 
reference mode behavior for the basic components of the system and developing those 
further into an influence diagram and a flow diagram in the simulation software.  Equally 
important to this procedure is a thorough validation process that tests the model’s 
structure, behavior, and boundary.  This step accumulates confidence in the model’s 
development and utility as a simulation tool of the actual event.  As stated before, in 
System Dynamics models, statistical analysis tests are not generally applicable due to the 
cause-and-effect nature of System Dynamics as opposed to the correlation nature of a 
statistical approach.   
 The first set of testing to be conducted on the model will focus on the model 
structure. These tests, the Structure Verification, Parameter Verification, Extreme 
Conditions and Boundary Adequacy tests, are compared to the descriptive knowledge of 
the system.  Both the Structure and Parameter Verification tests are conducted throughout 
the construction of the model.  Along every point in the model where system components 
are constructed, the system structure and parameters are carefully considered for their 
physical significance.  The Extreme Conditions test is applied to the system model in 
order to examine the model’s performance under conditions beyond the normal operating 
range.  The Boundary Accuracy test focuses on determining that the model has the 
correct level of aggregation, while still including all relevant system components.  Figure 
6 illustrates the correct aggregation level of System Dynamic models that consider a 
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balance of breadth and depth.  As the figure shows, the challenge is to avoid widening the 
breadth of the system boundary before reaching an appropriate level of aggregation.   
 
Figure 6: Effective level of aggregation for System Dynamics modeling, from IThink 
(2001). 
 
The next series of tests focus on the model’s behavior.  These tests attempt to compare 
the simulated behavior to the observed or intuitive behavior of the actual event.  These 
first tests are the Behavior Reproduction Test, the Behavior Anomaly Test, the Family 
Member Test, and the Boundary Adequacy Test.  All of these tests are conducted by 
observing the emergent behavior of the model during constructing and tracing anomalous 
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or undesired behavior back to a structural component of the model.  It is important to 
note that the main cause of model failures due to behavior is because of exogenous 
influences built into the model to “force” a certain behavior pattern, instead of the 
patterns being directly associated with a clear and physically meaningful system 
structure.  The behavior test that will be conducted after the system is constructed is the 
Behavior Sensitivity Test.  This test explores the range of parameters in which the model 
can maintain a reasonable behavior pattern.   
This validation process serves to gain more insight into the model construction 
and allow for more confidence in the research methodology.  The model construction and 
validation is conducted in stages and sequentially iterated to avoid unexpected behavior 
or flawed system structure.  The validation does not focus on conducting statistical 
analysis of the model’s output against historical data.  This would lead to forcing the 
model to fit constrained regressions developed with empirical data that would reduce the 
validity and usefulness of the System Dynamics model.  Rather, the validation focuses on 
ensuring the system structure, behavior, and boundary are correctly constructed, 
adequately aggregated, and sequentially verified against the dynamic hypothesis.   
The next chapter will demonstrate the development of the system models of the 
Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit Theory counterinsurgency strategies.  The chapter 
will also draw from the insight gained from both models’ influences and behaviors to 
determine the preferred method for generating the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy 
model that will address the lessons learned during the study of the previous models.   
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
 
The previous chapters of this research have served to establish the framework of the 
study by detailing the need for developing a counterinsurgency strategy model, the 
background and historic influences that guide its construction, and the methodology that 
will be employed.  This chapter explains in detail the incremental process for developing 
each of the components of a System Dynamics model and replicates that procedure for 
the various models that will be evaluated, tested, validated, and simulated.  This section 
will also discuss the expected and emergent behavior patterns that are viewed throughout 
the development of these models.  Finally, this section will use the information and 
insight gained from the models’ behaviors to yield a comprehensive counterinsurgency 
model that can aid policy makers in understanding the elements and influences that guide 
this level of warfare.   
 
Reference Modes and Natural Behaviors of the Hearts and Minds Model 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the general modeling process starts by examining all of the 
model elements for their viability as having a reference mode behavior.  This implies that 
not all of the model’s components will fall into a basic category of natural behaviors that 
can be identified by a reference mode behavior pattern.  Some elements will function as 
stand-alone parts of the overall model.  Other elements may also seem to exhibit a natural 
behavior that does not conform to the standard reference mode patterns, and, in these 
cases, it is very likely that the elements can be further disaggregated into more basic 
components.  For the purposes of the Hearts and Minds model, and subsequently the Cost 
 
36 
 
Benefit Theory model, the model’s elements were seen to have a natural behavior that 
follows the standard reference modes or did not demonstrate a natural behavior.  The 
elements of the Hearts and Minds model as well as their natural behavior are summarized 
in Table 2. 
Table 2: Elements and Natural Behaviors of Hearts and Minds model. 
Model Element Natural Behavior 
Popular Support 1st Order Draining 
Coalition Combat Operations Oscillation 
Host Nation Security Forces Oscillation 
Essential Services S‐Shaped 
Governance S‐Shaped 
Host Nation Economy S‐Shaped 
Information Operations No Natural Behavior 
Resentment No Natural Behavior 
Coalition Investment No Natural Behavior 
 
 
The first element studied for the Hearts and Minds model is that of Popular Support.  
Insurgency and counterinsurgency theorists dating back to Lawrence (1935), and most 
notably Galula (1964), have deemed support from the local populace as a necessity for 
successful counterinsurgency.  From an insurgent’s perspective, Popular Support 
provides logistical advantages, safe havens for organizing forces and evading government 
forces, and as a pool for recruiting for their cause.  Whereas, for the counterinsurgent, 
support conveys added intelligence and a limitation of the supplies, hideouts, and 
recruiting that insurgencies require. (FM 3-24, 2006)    
Human nature can attest to a behavior of gaining and losing interest in a particular 
subject; Popular Support gained or lost for the insurgency functions in much the same 
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way.  If, for example, a situation exists in which Popular Support is high for one side as 
an initial condition, then lack of action from that side, which is a condition for observing 
the natural behavior, would cause a loss in interest for that particular side.  This does not 
conclude that a loss of support for one side equates to a gain to the other, but more 
specifically a trend towards neutrality.  This natural behavior model can be described by 
a simple 1st Order Draining structure that gradually declines to zero. An example of the 
reference mode diagram and the graphical depiction of the behavior are shown in Figure 
7 (Shelley, 2008).   
 
Figure 7: Reference Mode Diagram and graph of Natural Behavior of Draining Structure. 
 
The next two elements of the Hearts and Minds model that will be evaluated are 
Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces.  These elements are 
merged in the environment of counterinsurgency because of their dynamic interactions 
and synergistic opportunities.  Nagl (2008) stated that “foreign forces can't win a 
counterinsurgency campaign, only local forces can do that.” It is the local government’s 
security forces, military and law enforcement, augmented and trained by their foreign 
allies that can approach the local populace and maintain the presence of security without 
allowing their actions to seem like an invasion.  Thus, when observing these two 
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elements from the perspective of their natural behavior, it is apparent that their levels are 
strongly dependent and complementary; as more coalition forces train and equip the host 
nation’s forces, then less coalition troops are required, until the level of host nation 
personnel begins to fall again.  This behavior follows an Oscillating reference mode 
construction and can be described by the diagram and graph in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Reference Mode Diagram and graph of Natural Behavior of Oscillating 
Structure. 
 
The next category of elements of the Hearts and Minds model are those that display an S-
Shaped reference mode behavior: Essential Services, Governance, and Host Nation 
Economy.  These elements, which entail all of the water, power, sanitation, and 
transportation infrastructure, the local and national government facilities and 
organization, and the state of an individual’s and the nation’s finances, are unmistakably 
major contributors to the counterinsurgency efforts.  Galula (1964) stipulated that it was 
these elements, the political side of counterinsurgency, which made up 80 percent of the 
contribution.  Initially, one can speculate that the three elements could be combined into a 
single local governmental factor.  But upon study of the Hearts and Minds theory and 
reflection upon their individual contributions, the model features these components as 
 
39 
 
separate entities that interact differently within the model and yield different weights to 
and from the influencing factors.   
 When the natural tendencies for these elements are observed independently, it can 
be seen that they exhibit an initial exponential growth period and a finite level that is 
bounded by resources or other environmental constraints.  Initially, the growth would be 
more subtle; as economic development is set in motion or the local government matures.  
This initial stage is followed by a period of greater expansion when the forces that act 
within each of these elements become more efficient and capable.  Finally the transition 
to their steady state again occurs gradually.  At this point services are established at 
required levels and economic independence is solidified.  These characteristics make up 
the S-Shaped behavior that is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Reference Mode Diagram and graph of Natural Behavior of S-Shaped 
Structure. 
 
Finally, Information Operations, Resentment, and Coalition Investment do not 
demonstrate independent natural behavior.  These elements all seem to share 
characteristics that would suggest they are 1st Order Draining structures, but because 
those drains are only apparent when they are influenced by other elements, then the 
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requirements for assigning a natural behavior are not met.  Nonetheless, the elements 
continue to be important aspects of the counterinsurgency system and their lack of 
independent behavioral characteristics does not diminish the weight of their 
contributions.  
Through the development of an initial System Dynamics model, Baker (2006) 
suggested that poor intelligence was a contributing factor in negating the efforts that 
security and the rule of law could provide for the counterinsurgency.  This study 
broadens the reach of Information Operations to not only include intelligence, but an 
integrated use of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological 
operations, military deception, and operations security (JP 3-13, 2006).  FM 3-24 (2006) 
emphasizes the need for effective Information Operations to broadcast government and 
counterinsurgent actions and successes in an effort to counteract insurgent propaganda.  
Second, Resentment is a key component of the model that describes the sentiments of the 
population towards foreign combat forces.  These feelings stem from perceptions of 
indiscriminate military action, excess collateral damage, or just the presence of an 
occupying force.  Finally, Coalition Investment is the element that considers all of the 
resources from the allies that supports the local government’s fight against the 
insurgency.  All of these elements, even though distinct and independent in the context of 
their influences, share their structural tendency to drain information, feelings of 
resentment, or resources once they are acted upon from other influences of the model.  If 
a population begins with a high level of Resentment, for example, then only the 
interjection of information pertaining to the merits of the local government and 
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contributions of the coalition will deplete their position towards having no ill feelings at 
all.  
 
Influence Diagrams of the Hearts and Minds Model 
Individually, all of the independent influence structures of each element arising from 
each reference mode behavior pattern form the building blocks of the complete model’s 
influence diagram.  Here the model influences are identified and their relative influence 
directions determined.  Initially, the blank canvas of the influence diagram, as shown in 
Figure 10, is nothing more than the collection of each independent influence structure of 
the elements that make up their natural behaviors.   
 
Figure 10: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing independent influence 
structures of individual elements. 
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The first collection of influences that are identified and depicted in the diagram are those 
affecting Popular Support.  Most of the elements are affected directly by Popular 
Support and, in turn, provide feedback in the form of a Reinforcing Loop.  In the example 
of Host Nation Security Forces, Popular Support will work to diminish the loss of Host 
Nation Security Forces through increasing recruiting and lowering attrition.  When this 
losing factor is acted upon in a negative fashion by Popular Support, the result is an 
increase in the net level of Host Nation Security Forces.  This increased level of local 
military and law enforcement increases the Popular Support for the Host Nation by 
providing the populace with a stable and secure environment that directly reflects the 
government’s policies and actions.  The loop will continue its reinforcing nature.  Similar 
arguments suggest the same reinforcing nature also exists for the elements of 
Governance, Essential Services, and Host Nation Economy.  These influences are shown 
in Figure 11.  As a matter of notation and in order to simplify the final influence diagram, 
the flows that cause gains or reductions to the element’s stocks have not been showed.  
But it is important to understand that it is these flow structures that manage the 
magnitude and direction of the influences and that they must be present and effectively 
described during the development of the flow diagram.   
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Figure 11: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing influences of Popular 
Support with Host Nation Security Forces, Essential Services, Host Nation Economy, and 
Governance. 
  
The influence of Popular Support on Resentment is similar to the previous elements.  In 
this case the feedback from Resentment flows back directly into decreasing Popular 
Support and is also indirectly seen through Resentment’s influence on Host Nation 
Security Forces.  In this case, an increase in Popular Support would directly result in a 
decrease in the Resentment felt by the populace because of their gains in confidence in 
the Host Nation.  For the direct influence, this results in a gain in Popular Support and a 
reinforcing loop.  In the case of the indirect influence, reduced Resentment causes a direct 
reduction in the losses of Host Nation Security Forces.  Like before, the losses are 
attributed to recruiting and retention of security personnel; positive gains in Resentment 
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would decrease recruiting and retention efforts, whereas lower feelings of Resentment 
increase these trends.  Again, as seen before, these factors then cause increases to the 
levels of Host Nation Security Forces and, subsequently, increases to Popular Support.   
 The other influences that are present with Popular Support are those affecting 
Information Operations and Coalition Investment.  In both of these cases Popular 
Support serves as an input to their dynamics and only feeds back into Popular Support 
through aggregated or obscure mediators.  In the case of Information Operations, 
Popular Support serves as a source of intelligence, particularly Human Intelligence (or 
HUMINT), that can be exploited for use with kinetic operations and to survey the 
effectiveness of local government and coalition policies.  But, unlike in the previous 
examples, it is not logical to suppose that Information Operations themselves affect 
Popular Support.  Some may say that propaganda of coalition and government policies 
and actions would directly affect Popular Support.  But, in fact, this feedback occurs 
through various mediating factors such as an increase in the Perception of Good 
Governance and through a reduction in Feelings of Resentment.  More on the influences 
of Information Operations will be discussed further in this section.   
Finally, Popular Support also directly affects the level of Coalition Investment 
that is being allocated to the counterinsurgency.  Unlike for the case of Information 
Operations, here Popular Support acts as a drain on the level of Coalition Investment.  
Popular Support is seen as a metric for which the coalition judges the success of the 
counterinsurgency; as Popular Support rises, then the coalition can begin withdrawing its 
efforts and its investment.   
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The effects of Popular Support on all of the elements discussed up to this point 
are shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing the influences of 
Popular Support. 
 The next influence element that will be connected to the model will be Resentment.  
Resentment, like the other elements that have a Draining reference mode, will simply 
dissipate if left alone.  But, when placed in the context of the counterinsurgency system, 
it will react to the influences within the system.  In the case of Resentment, it is the 
presence of Coalition Combat Operations that supplies the building of these feelings by 
the populace.  The reinforcing feedback caused by this influence is channeled back 
through Resentment’s control over Host Nation Security Forces, which is in an 
Oscillating structure with Coalition Combat Operations.  The other influence that is 
present with Feelings of Resentment is a direct negative relationship with Perception of 
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Good Governance.  As these feelings continue to grow because of the presence of foreign 
troops and their conduct of military operations, then the populace will lose faith in the 
reach of the local government.  It is true that these feelings can be mitigated and that 
influence will be discussed further in this section.  The influences of Resentment on the 
system components are depicted in Figure 13.   
 
Figure 13: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing the influences of 
Resentment. 
  
Now the influences pertaining to Information Operations can be described and added to 
the model.  Here two reinforcing loops are present, caused by the Host Nation Economy 
and Governance.  Both of these elements offer ammunition to Information Operations in 
the form of media coverage of government events and the state of the economy.  They 
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also both receive feedback from Information Operations to reinforce their growth; when 
investors, for the example of the Host Nation Economy, are introduced to positive news 
about the economic conditions, then they are more likely to invest further.  Similarly, 
Essential Services feed the stock of Information Operations with positive media 
coverage, but does not receive the same feedback influence; positive news of previous 
successes will not alter the plans for developing these services, they will be managed 
based on the needs of the population.  Information Operations also play a role in 
diminishing the Feelings of Resentment that is caused by the presence of coalition forces.  
Greater sources of information reduce the likelihood of collateral damage, unnecessary 
raids, or targeting innocents that are suspected of cooperating with the insurgents.  
Information Operations also reduce the anxiety that the public can feel during the 
insurgency by reinforcing the position of the government and the actions that the local 
leaders and the coalition have taken to improve the infrastructure and economy.  The 
influences of Information Operations, which are shown in Figure 14, have been found to 
be of great importance to the system because of their reach and diversity and will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter and during the findings of the study.   
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Figure 14: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing the influences of 
Information Operations. 
  
The final elements that will be connected are those that are supplied by Coalition 
Investment.  It is assumed that an external coalition will support the local government 
against the insurgency not only with military, economic, and political support, but also 
with resources.  These resources take the form of financial support, personnel, equipment, 
and logistics and are required for starting all of the coalition counterinsurgency elements: 
Coalition Combat Operations, Information Operations, Essential Services, and Economic 
Development.  These influences also introduce very necessary Compensating Loops into 
the system.  These loops work to stabilize the reinforcing influences that have dominated 
the environment to this point.  The compensating nature effectively reduces the Host 
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Nation’s dependency on the coalition as conditions improve.  For this to work, the 
government then needs to take over these resources once the coalition has begun to 
withdraw.  Thus, influences from Governance to these elements, in this case Host Nation 
Security Forces, Economic Development, and Essential Services, emerge.  
 The complete depiction of the influence diagram that describes the Hearts and 
Minds counterinsurgency model is shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model. 
 
Flow Diagrams of the Hearts and Minds Model 
The process of operationalizing the influence diagram through simulation is done with 
the aid of System Dynamics software.  STELLA® (version 9.0.2, by ISEE, Inc) is used 
 
50 
 
for this study because of its widespread acceptance among System Dynamics proponents.  
The following section will detail the process that converts the logical development of 
system influences into graphical representations of system behavior.   
 The first step in establishing the framework for developing the flow diagram is to 
establish the general requirements for the model simulation.  First the length and time 
interval of the simulation is determined.  Following past examples of 
counterinsurgencies, we have seen that the conflict in Algeria lasted eight years, and the 
Malayan Emergency, the conflict that gave birth to the concept of Heart and Minds, had a 
duration of 12 years (O’Neill, 2001).  Recently, Nagl (2008) suggested that the average 
counterinsurgency campaign is approximately 10 years.  These estimates provide a 
starting point for establishing the length of the simulation.  In an effort to keep the 
modeling and simulation as uncomplicated as practical, a length of 10 years is selected; 
which will be expressed in terms of months, thus giving the simulation a range from zero 
to 120 months.  As explained before, the exact timescale of a month is not important for 
this type of complex social model and the interpretation must not focus on relative 
behavior over the course of one or two months, but in terms of short-, medium-, and 
long-term horizons.   
 The modeling can now proceed to translating the individual reference mode 
influence diagrams into flow diagrams and then incrementally connecting the elements in 
the same manner as the influence diagram that was previously developed.  The goal is to 
initially establish the range of values of coefficients that operationalize each of the 
elements so that they mirror the natural behavior and can continue to exert he same level 
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of influence as other system influences come to bear on the elements.  It is apparent that 
the initial step of establishing the individual flow diagrams and connecting them 
incrementally is critical to the usefulness and validity of the model.   
As with the case of the natural behaviors and the influence diagrams, the flow 
diagram development process will begin with Popular Support.  Popular Support, on an 
individual basis, can exist as being achieved by one side or another, or can also take the 
form of a neutral or passive support (FM 3-24, 2006).  But, simulating behavior at the 
level of individual members of a population and attempting to judge their perception as to 
falling in one of three categories of support would lead to far more detail than this study 
requires.  In an effort to take a more elevated view of the system and maintain an 
adequate level of aggregation, a convention of positive and negative support will be 
adopted.  When Popular Support is positive, the support resides with the 
counterinsurgents and the local government; a negative value of Popular Support 
indicates strengthening on the insurgent’s part. And, as observed from the natural 
behavior, if none of the forces are acting to a greater degree than the other, then Popular 
Support will tend towards neutrality. The flow diagram and the graphical output of 
Popular Support’s natural behavior are shown in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Popular Support element 
in the Hearts and Minds model. 
  
The next elements that will be studied via the flow diagramming process are Coalition 
Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces.  This reference mode is more 
complex than the simple Draining Structure seen for Popular Support, Coalition 
Investment, Information Operations, and Resentment.  Also, the boundaries of these 
behaviors require a different approach as seen before; Popular Support arbitrarily started 
at 100 (or -100) and was only required to dissipate to zero.  In this case the maximum 
spike and the steady state values of forces are of importance.  Following the most recent 
example of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the maximum number of coalition military forces 
was 164,000 (Baker & Hamilton, 2006), which would, according to estimates of initial 
planning metrics, be maintained at a level of 30,000 to 40,000 (Global Security, 2008).  
The Iraqi Security Forces numbered at it greatest level at approximately 300,000 (Baker 
& Hamilton, 2006) and would finish with an end-state value of approximately 137,000 
(DoD, 2006).  These values only provide a reference from which to begin the modeling 
process and should not be interpreted as exact or required for the model to be valid.   
 
53 
 
 The flow diagram and the graphical output of the natural behavior of Coalition 
Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces are shown in Figure 17.   
 
Figure 17: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Coalition Combat 
Operations and Host Nation Security Forces elements in the Hearts and Minds model. 
 
The graphical representation of the natural behavior of these elements does have one 
characteristic that should be discussed.  The level of Coalition Combat Operations begins 
to steadily increase and reaches its maximum value of approximately 160 (representing 
thousands of coalition troops).  Then, as expected, the level of Host Nation Security 
Forces continues to increase and the level of coalition support now decreases 
proportionally.  Then a low of zero is reached by the level of Coalition Combat 
Operations, before it then begins to rise again in response to the diminished value of Host 
Nation Security Forces.  This does not imply that after the initial surge the coalition 
should remove its troops, only to bring them back several months later.  The dampened 
oscillation that is observed from the structure is a function of the boundary values and 
steady state objective of the structure and serves to represent physical constraints of the 
elemental stocks.  In a standard oscillating structure, one that is not dampened by the 
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physical constraints of the model, the pure oscillation would maintain a slightly different 
characteristic behavior.  But the requirements of this particular model, in this case the 
addition of the Host Nation Security Forces Compounding Factor which represents the 
local forces ability to train their own once they are established, is necessary for the 
model’s development and an addition to the standard structure.   
 The final set of reference modes that will be operationalized into a flow diagram 
are the S-Shaped structures of Governance, Essential Services, and Host Nation 
Economy.  Since these factor have such variability across regions and time, it would be 
impractical to estimate values for these elements that would relate to actual examples or 
events.  The important aspect of developing these flow diagrams is to obtain an 
acceptable reference mode behavior and not a designated set of values.  Thus, for all of 
these elements a standard steady state value of 100 was selected as the maximum and the 
value will be achieved at approximately the half way point in the simulation; 60 months 
for this model.   
 The flow diagram and the graphical output of Essential Services’ natural behavior 
are shown in Figure 18.  The flow diagram and graph of Host Nation Economy are not 
shown because they are identical to those of Essential Services.  The flow diagram and 
the graphical output of Governance’s natural behavior are shown in Figure 19.   
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Figure 18: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Coalition Essential 
Services element in the Hearts and Minds model. 
  
 
Figure 19: Flow Diagram and graph of emergent behavior of Governance element in the 
Hearts and Minds model. 
 
The next step in the process of developing the Hearts and Minds model is to begin to 
incrementally combine the individual flow diagrams that depict each of the elemental 
reference modes.  Only when anomalous behavior patterns are spotted, should the 
previously established coefficient values and modeling parameters be changed.  This 
ensures that the model is not altered during the modeling process to fulfill a previously 
derived conclusion.   
 The following process will only demonstrate key examples or unusual modeling 
circumstances because of the numerous steps in the procedure.  For example, in order to 
connect Popular Support to Host Nation Security Forces through the previously 
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established influence, the modeler must first connect the stock of Popular Support to the 
flow of Losing HN Security Forces through the HN Security Forces Draining Factor.  
The emergent behavior is then observed and compared to the expected pattern.  In this 
case, it is expected that an increased level of Popular Support would decrease the losses 
associated with Host Nation Security Forces and would cause this element to peak at a 
higher maximum and reach a higher steady state value.  If this behavior is seen, as it was 
with this case, then the connection is removed and the complementing influence is tested.  
Now the level of Host Nation Security Forces will add to the stock of Popular Support.  
The emergent behavior, both the anticipated and the observed after making this 
connection, shows that Popular Support does not drain completely to zero.  Finally both 
connections are made and the behavior of the new flow diagram is observed.  In this case 
the level of Popular Support drops initially, but maintains a higher level than without the 
influence of Host Nation Security Forces.  For their part, the level of Host Nation 
Security Forces is maintained at a slightly higher level thanks to the decrease in loss 
associated with Popular Support’s influence.  The flow diagram showing the influence 
feedback between these two elements is shown in Figure 20.   
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Figure 20: Flow Diagram of interaction between the Popular Support element and the 
Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces elements in the Hearts 
and Minds model. 
 
Continuing to incrementally add the remaining influence elements into the Hearts and 
Minds model yields the completed version of the flow diagram (Figure 21).  Also, Table 
3 summarizes the names, values, and units of the coefficients that have been described 
during the construction of this flow diagram.   
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Figure 21: Flow Diagram of Hearts and Minds model. 
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Table 3: Names, values, and units of coefficients used in the development of the Hearts 
and Minds model Flow Diagram. 
 
Coefficient Name Coefficient Value Coefficient Units 
Popular Support Flow Factor 0.1 1/month 
Coalition Combat Support Compounding 
Factor 
 
x = Percentage Coalition Investment to 
Security  
Coalition Combat Operations/month 
Coalition Combat Support  Draining 
Factor 
0.19 
Coalition Combat Operations/(HN Security 
Forces*month)  
HN Security Forces Compounding Factor 0.005  
x = HN Security Forces 
HN Security Forces /(Coalition Combat 
Operation*month) 
HN Security Forces Draining Factor 
0.0033 0 
0.00062 0 
x = HN Security Forces 
1/month 
Services Compounding Factor 0.0001  
x = Essential Services 
1/month 
Services  Draining Factor 0.05 1/month 
Economic Development Compounding 
Factor 
0.0001  
x = Host Nation Economy 
1/month 
Economic Development Draining Factor 0.05 1/month 
Governance Compounding Factor 0.001  
x = Perception of Good Governance 
1/month 
Governance Draining Factor 0.05 1/month 
Services Factor 0.067  
x = Essential Services 
Popular Support/month 
HN Security Level Factor 0.05  
x = HN Security Forces 
Popular Support/month 
Economic Factor 0.067  
x = Host Nation Economy 
Popular Support/month 
Governance Factor 0.067  
x = Perception of Good Governance 
Popular Support/month 
Support Resentment Factor 0.25  1/month 
Security Resentment Factor  0.1  HN Security Forces/(Resentment*month)  
Security Governance Factor  0.025  HN Security/(Governance*month)  
Services Governance Factor  0.05  Services/(Governance*month)  
Services Support Factor  0.1  Services/(Popular Support*month)  
Econ Gov Factor  
0.05 0.5 10 
0.005 0.05 10 
x = Perception of Good Governance 
Economic Development/month  
Econ Info Ops  Factor  
0.15 1.0 10 
0.5 10 
x = Information Operations 
Economic Development/month  
Economy Support Factor  0.1  
x = Popular Support 
Economic Development/month  
Governance Resentment Factor  0.0075  Governance/(Resentment*month)  
Governance Info Ops Factor  
0.15 1.0 10 
0.5 10 
x = Information Operations 
Governance/month  
Resentment Factor  0.16 6 
x = Coalition Combat Operations 
Resentment/month  
Resentment Info Factor  0.1  
x = Information Operations 
Resentment/month 
Support Coalition Investment Factor  0.003  
Coalition Investment/(Popular 
Support*month)  
Info Ops Services Factor  
0.2 0.1 10 
0.1 10 
x = Essential Services 
Information Operations/month  
Info Ops Economy Factor  
0.4 0.15 10 
0.25 10 
x = Host Nation Economy 
Information Operations/month 
Info Ops Support Factor  0.004  
x = Popular Support 
Information Operations/month 
Info Ops Governance Factor  
0.4 0.15 10 
0.25 10 
x = Perception of Good Governance 
Information Operations/month 
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Results and Discussion of Hearts and Minds Model Simulation  
The flow diagram presented in Figure 21 demonstrates the relevant influences that, 
according to the historical review of the theory’s development and applications, are 
crucial in defining the Hearts and Minds counterinsurgency strategy.  During the 
development of the model, several key factors have begun to emerge as important to the 
discussion of this theory.  First, the influence diagram and the flow diagram both 
demonstrate the strength of the influence of Information Operations on the system; 
Popular Support, the predominant element in the system and the measure of greatest 
importance, is the only other element to have as many influences external to its natural 
behavior.   
This finding suggests that Information Operations may merit equal ranking in 
terms of resource allocation towards the counterinsurgency campaign.  While historical 
attention has been given to the division of resources between the military and political 
components, such as Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964), the value of information superiority 
and exploitation now introduces an entirely different approach to this debate.  Even 
recent discussion on Hearts and Minds theory has allocated very little attention (or even 
none at all) to the influences of Information Operations.   
Nagl (2002), Long (2006), and Kahl (2007) provide excellent discussions on the 
origins and implications of Hearts and Minds.  Yet, none of them mention Information 
Operations or the need for controlling or managing information as a part of the strategy.  
Kilcullen (2008) is more eager to mention the necessity of bolstering information assets 
in successful counterinsurgency efforts, but falls short of making substantial arguments as 
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to the validity of his suggestions or recommendations for the relative importance of 
Information Operations when compared to the traditional counterinsurgency tools.  The 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2006), on the other hand, is probably the best 
proponent of the use of information as a key role in its strategy.  FM 3-24 details its 
Logical Lines of Operations as being encompassed around wide ranging information 
exploitation.  Other recent proponents of Information Operations are those that view this 
factor from a technological stand point.  Even though Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance conducted by air and space platforms are indispensable assets in modern 
warfare, counterinsurgency included, (Dunlap, 2007) this is only a portion of the total 
Information Operations arsenal.  A discussion on the importance of information to 
counterinsurgency must be inclusive of its technical (Signal’s Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance) and non-technical (Human Intelligence and Psychological 
Operations) aspects.  The construction of this model, and subsequent exploration of its 
emergent behavior patterns, will add greatly to this debate.   
The Hearts and Minds model is constructed in such a manner that the emergent 
behavior patterns of all of its elements can be explored under a variety of situations.  
First, the model was designed to allow the researcher to manipulate the amount of 
Coalition Investment that is allocated to each of the counterinsurgency resources it feeds: 
Coalition Combat Operations, Essential Services, Host Nation Economy, and Information 
Operations.  This feature provides this model with the flexibility to study the variability 
of the strategy’s success by altering the combination of resources and observing the 
behavior of key indicators, such as the behavior of Popular Support, Resentment, or 
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Governance.  The model is also capable of adjusting the rate at which Coalition 
Investment responds to a shift in Popular Support.  With this, the model is able to provide 
guidance to policy makers as to how quickly the coalition can transition authority to the 
local government without facing unacceptable risk to the mission.  This Hearts and Minds 
model can also phase operations that could shift the mix of resources to other elements 
during different stages of the timeline.  This would allow decision makers to model 
various approaches that focus on different areas, such as focusing on security during the 
short-term and then shifting their efforts to developing essential services and the 
economy in later stages.  The following section will explore several of these situations in 
order to demonstrate the validity and flexibility of the simulation.  However, it is not the 
intention of this research to explore all of the possible alternatives of this theory or 
determine optimal operating conditions.  Further research will be recommended in 
Chapter 5 that further reinforces the findings of the models developed during this study.   
During the model’s construction, one of the design factors used to develop and 
test model influences and interactions was the determination of the starting value of 
Coalition Investment.  Like all elements, Coalition Investment is expressed in terms of 
some unit of measure; time, number of people, and amount of dollars are all common.  
For this case the amount of Coalition Investment is not as important as the relative 
allocation of the resources.  Thus, the stock in question is designated as having an initial 
value of 100 with a percentage unit of measure assigned.  In this manner distribution of 
resources can be simply quantified as a portion of 100 percent.  Initially the logical 
development of the model suggested that equally distributing Coalition Investment 
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among the four elements it drives (Coalition Combat Operations, Information 
Operations, Essential Services, and Host Nation Economy) would provide an adequate 
starting point for observing the model’s behavior.  This baseline emergent behavior plot 
is shown in Figure 22.   
The plots depicted in Figure 22 through Figure 26  show the behavior patterns of 
the main indicators of the Hearts and Minds model: (1) Popular Support, (2) Coalition 
Investment, (3) Resentment, (4) Coalition Combat Operations, and (5) Host Nation 
Security Forces.  The plot is scaled for a range of values from zero to 300 for Popular 
Support, Coalition Combat Operations, and Host Nation Security Forces and from zero 
to 100 for Coalition Investment and Resentment.  These ranges of values are designed to 
provide the greatest appreciation for the detail of the behavior patterns and may be 
changed in order to appreciate behavioral details.   
 
Figure 22: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds model given even allocation of 
Coalition Investment to Security, Economy, Services, and Information Operations. 
Figure 22 provides great insight and a positive outlook into the viability of the Hearts and 
Minds model.  The first indicator, Popular Support, was designed to maintain positive 
(1) Popular Support for Host Nation
(2) Coalition Investment 
(3) Feelings of Resentment 
(4) Coalition Combat Operations 
(5) Host Nation Security Forces 
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values for situations in which the support was given to the local government and that the 
magnitude of these values would determine their relative support.  Here, Popular Support 
begins to drop during the initial stages of the campaign, but this level does not drop into 
negative values.  The initial decline of Popular Support is attributed to the heightened 
Feelings of Resentment that begin to spike during this time.  Since the short-term phase 
introduces many coalition troops which will cause an increase in Resentment and 
Information Operations have not had time to fully develop, then this reaction by the 
population is normal and expected.  In the later stages of the counterinsurgency, as troop 
levels decrease because of added security, development of critical infrastructure and the 
economy, and a growing information campaign, then Resentment begins to diminish until 
it no longer influences the system and Popular Support is able to stabilize at a relatively 
high and steady level.  Throughout this entire time, Coalition Investment has reacted to 
the level of Popular Support; initially dropping gradually with the positive support trend 
and decreasing more rapidly as Popular Support reaches its positive, stable value.   
Equally distributing Coalition Investment among the four elements provides an 
excellent baseline from which to evaluate other combinations of resources.  With this 
model, policy makers can test different scenarios that focus resources on one or more 
elements, providing great insight into the complexities of the Hearts and Minds strategy.  
The first of these scenarios that will be considered is the one proposed by Galula (1964).  
The French counterinsurgent suggested that fighting an insurgency was 20 percent 
military and 80 percent political.  To test this theory the model was adjusted to provide 
the Coalition Combat Operation’s element with 20 percent of the coalition’s resource, 
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while the remaining 80 percent will be divided equally among the remaining factors.  The 
plot demonstrating this behavior is shown in Figure 23.   
 
Figure 23: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds model given allocation of Coalition 
Investment following Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964): 20% to Security and 80% equally to 
Economy, Services, and Information Operations. 
 
The behavior shown in Figure 23 depicting Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964) has several key 
distinctions compared to the baseline behavior model.  First, Popular Support seems to 
stabilize much quicker, but at a cost of not reaching the same level as before.  In many 
ways this scenario proves to be more beneficial because the level of Popular Support is 
still maintained in the positive region throughout the simulation, but the lack of 
turbulence during the initial stages allows planners to reduce Coalition Investment at a 
greater rate earlier in the timeline.  The implication of providing less resources to the 
combat aspects, 20 percent instead of 25 percent, allows initial foreign troop levels to 
stay lower and not cause the spikes in Resentment that were seen before.  The simulation 
suggests that effective training of Host Nation Security Forces would be more successful 
than employing large quantities of coalition troops towards security operations.  One way 
(1) Popular Support for Host Nation 
(2) Coalition Investment 
(3) Feelings of Resentment 
(4) Coalition Combat Operations 
(5) Host Nation Security Forces 
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to support this finding is to adjust the model once again and, this time, focus the 
coalition’s resources on Coalition Combat Operations; thus testing the opposed theory.  
The results of this simulation are shown in Figure 24 and Figure 25.  Figure 24 
demonstrates the model’s behavior according to the newly adjusted parameters on the 
same scale that has been used in the previous examples.  In order to view the relative 
behaviors more clearly, Figure 25 expands the viewing range of the plot’s scale.   
 
Figure 24: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds given allocation of Coalition 
Investment following Combat Operations-focused strategy: 55% to Security and 45% 
equally to Economy, Services, and Information Operations. 
 
(1) Popular Support for Host Nation 
(2) Coalition Investment 
(3) Feelings of Resentment 
(4) Coalition Combat Operations 
(5) Host Nation Security Forces 
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Figure 25: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds given allocation of Coalition 
Investment following Combat Operations-focused strategy: 55% to Security and 45% 
equally to Economy, Services, and Information Operations.  The plot has been re-scaled 
from standard view in order to observe behavior patterns. 
 
These two figures demonstrate the dangers of allocating too many resources towards 
combat operations because of the high risk of increasing Feelings of Resentment to such a 
point that Popular Support shifts to levels that cannot be regained.    
 The final comparison that will be made at this stage of the research will be to 
explore the initial intuition regarding the importance of Information Operations.  Due to 
its reach of influence with the greatest number of the model elements, it is expected that 
not granting this factor the adequate amount of recourses would be detrimental to the 
counterinsurgency.  This assumption is confirmed by the behavior shown in Figure 26.  
This figure has also been scaled to allow the observer to appreciate the behavior of the 
model’s elements beyond the original plotted scale.   
 
(1) Popular Support for Host Nation 
(2) Coalition Investment 
(3) Feelings of Resentment 
(4) Coalition Combat Operations 
(5) Host Nation Security Forces 
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Figure 26: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds given allocation of Coalition 
Investment following strategy that does not consider Information Operations: 0% to 
Information Operations and 100% equally to Security, Economy, and Services. The plot 
has been re-scaled from standard view in order to observe behavior patterns. 
 
The behavior in Figure 25 can be attributed to the growth of Resentment and the 
counterinsurgent’s attempt to employ more Coalition Combat Operations to increase 
Popular Support; which reinforced the downward spiral of Resentment and negative 
support.  But, that same trend is not apparent in Figure 26.  Even though Resentment 
grows, it only reaches approximately half the maximum level over the same timeline.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the elimination of Information Operations (the only drain 
on Resentment other than its loss due to increased Popular Support) causes the system to 
not react as negatively to the continued Coalition Investment in security, infrastructure, 
and the economy.  
 The insight gained from the development of the Hearts and Minds model provides 
a necessary first step in exploring the requirements of today’s military planners.  But, this 
theory, and the model that describes it, fails to address some key aspects that have lead to 
(1) Popular Support for Host Nation 
(2) Coalition Investment 
(3) Feelings of Resentment 
(4) Coalition Combat Operations 
(5) Host Nation Security Forces 
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its criticism by military officials and scholars alike.  The other counterinsurgency theory 
that will be evaluated is the Cost Benefit Theory.   
 
Reference Modes and Natural Behaviors of the Cost Benefit Theory Model 
Developed during the Vietnam conflict, Cost Benefit Theory focuses its strategy around 
the quantifiable objectives of Insurgent Activities and Insurgent Organizational 
Mechanisms.  With these factors being the targets of the counterinsurgency, then the 
Population’s Behavior, and not its feelings like in Hearts and Minds, serves as the 
indicator of the counterinsurgency effectiveness (Leites & Wolf, 1970).  In this case 
Population Behavior is the action that the population takes in favor of the host 
government; voting in the elections, respecting the rule or law, and paying taxes are 
examples of this measure.   While similar to Popular Support from the Hearts and Minds 
model, Population Behavior accounts for the measurable acts of the locals and not their 
general attitudes towards the government.  Also, like Popular Support, Population 
Behavior exhibits a Draining structure as its natural behavior.  As before, the elements of 
the Cost benefit Theory model as well as their natural behavior are summarized in Table 
4. 
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Table 4: Elements and Natural Behaviors of Cost Benefit Theory model. 
Model Element  Reference Mode 
Population Behavior 1st Order Draining
Coalition Combat Operations S‐Shaped
Host Nation Capacity S‐Shaped
Insurgent Activities Stock Adjustment – Approach to Steady 
State  
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms No Natural Behavior 
Coalition Investment No Natural behavior 
Information Operations No Natural Behavior 
Internal Resources No Natural Behavior 
External Resources No Natural Behavior 
 
 
Insurgent Activities encompasses all of the actions that the insurgency takes in order to 
meet its military and political objectives.  These activities are not limited to acts of 
violence alone, but also consist of anti-government propaganda, recruiting, and attempts 
at exerting religious or social influence over the population.  When observing these 
activities, the natural behavior of this element can be seen as a rapid increase from the 
beginning that tapers off to a level state once objectives are reached or they are limited by 
the available resources.  The quick initial increase in activities can be seen in historic 
examples where a large event or a series of incidents trigger the start of the insurgency, 
rather than a slow progression towards revolt. (O’Neill, 2001)  This behavior may seem 
to mimic an S-Shaped Structure, but since the initial increase is rapid rather than gradual, 
then the behavior is categorized as a Stock Adjustment Structure (or an Approach to 
Steady State Structure).  An example of this pattern can be seen in Figure 27.   
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Figure 27: Reference Mode Diagram and graph of Natural behavior of Approach to 
Steady State Structure. 
 
In order to accomplish these activities, the insurgency needs strong organization.  
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms represent the insurgency’s leadership, military, 
recruiting, and propaganda structures (Leites & Wolf, 1970).  This element is structurally 
unique in that it does not experience a natural behavior.  It is not logical to attempt to 
observe this element outside of the context of the system as a whole and thus its natural 
tendencies cannot be hypothesized.  This type of model element is not uncommon, but, in 
general terms, it is more desirable for the modeler to make every attempt to attribute a 
natural behavior to the prominent stocks.  Other elements in this model that also do not 
have natural behaviors that could be determined are the Internal and External Resources, 
Information Operations and Coalition Investment; which will be discussed further in this 
section.  
By challenging the organizational and active elements through Coalition Combat 
Operations and Information Operations, the coalition and local government seek to 
disrupt the insurgency’s ability to conduct activities and negatively affect the population.  
Even though these elements are shared with Hearts and Minds, this philosophical 
difference in their influence directly contrasts the logic used to develop the Hearts and 
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Minds model; while Hearts and Minds employed security, information, and the local 
government to boost Popular Support, Cost Benefit Theory directly seeks to disrupt 
insurgent structures and reduce their capacity to conduct operations (Peters, 2006).  The 
Coalition Combat Operations element, as opposed to its representation in Hearts and 
Minds, includes the forces that are also provided by the host nation and thus does not 
exist in the same structure as the previous model.  Here the element behaves as a resource 
that begins gradually as forces are built up and reaches a maximum level as defined by 
the available resources.  This behavior aligns with the classic S-Shaped Structure seen 
before.  As opposed to those behaviors, the construction of this structure has a subtle 
difference.  Other elements that have an S-Shaped behavior, such as the Host Nation 
Capacity element in this model, manager their growth by limiting its ability for continued 
growth based on their resources.  In the case of Coalition Combat Operations, the growth 
is a function of the requirement to continue targeting the insurgency and is adjusted by a 
decreased need for additional combat support.  These subtle differences can be seen in 
their natural influence diagrams shown in Figure 28 and their natural behavior is S-
Shaped as seen in Figure 9.   
 
Figure 28: Reference Mode Diagrams of S-shaped Structures. 
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Leites and Wolf (1970) identify several other key components that distinguished Cost 
Benefit Theory from the previous strategy.  This involves their emphasis on the 
importance of targeting the resources used by the insurgency.  They believed that if the 
cost in obtaining resources, both internal and external, were forced to be higher than their 
expected benefit, then the insurgency would not be successful.  The elements, Internal 
Resources and External Resources, are added to the model in order to account for this 
component of the theory.  It is important to note that the elements have been chosen to 
remain separate because of their distinction in availability and their ability to be disrupted 
by the coalition.  Internal Resources are more available to the insurgency, but they can 
also be limited by increased security and information.  External Resources are more 
scarce, but cannot be cut off by the coalition; hence their distinction as being external to 
the system.  These external resources become more prominent as technology, more 
specifically information technology, expand the reaches of the insurgency’s efforts 
beyond the borders of the conflict.   
With the natural behaviors identified and the associated influence diagrams of all 
of the theory’s elements constructed, the process now focuses on developing the 
comprehensive influence diagram.   
 
Influence Diagrams of the Cost Benefit Theory Model 
The reference mode diagrams developed in the previous section are the first step in 
identifying the individual influences and building the influence diagram.  These 
individual diagrams can be seen in Figure 29.   
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Figure 29: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model showing the independent 
influence structures of individual elements. 
 
The first influence element that will be considered is the Insurgent’s Organizational 
Mechanism.  This factor is primarily responsible for organizing and directing Insurgent 
Activities.  Thus, a direct, positive influence can be traced from the insurgent’s leadership 
to their ability to conduct operations.  During the development of this model it is 
noteworthy that most of the feedback influences that generate reinforcing or 
compensating behavioral loops are mediated through other elements; this is an example 
of this observation.  As Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms increase, then more 
Insurgent Activities can be managed.  This causes a drop in Population Behavior 
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supportive of the local government.  As this behavior tends away from the government, 
the Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms, which rely on a population being susceptible 
to recruiting and propaganda, will further be reinforced.  This Reinforcing Loop and the 
influences that work to increase (Internal Resources and External Resources) or decrease 
(Coalition Combat Operations and Information Operations) Insurgent Organizational 
Mechanisms are shown in Figure 30.   
 
Figure 30: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model showing influences of 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms. 
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 Next, the influences added by Insurgent Activities will be identified and 
incorporated into the influence diagram.  This element possesses two opportunities for 
reinforcing behavior.  First, as insurgent operations rise, they work to increase the 
availability of Internal Resources.  These are critical to improving organization and, as a 
result, further escalate Insurgent Activities.  The next Reinforcing Loop that is formed by 
Insurgent Activities comes from its effect on Host Nation Capacity.  The insurgency 
directly attacks the local government’s ability to govern, which causes a reduction in the 
Population’s Behavior in Favor of the Host Nation and further increases in the 
insurgency’s organizational structures and operational capability.  Finally, Insurgent 
Activities are dampened by the intervention of Coalition Combat Operations.  Security 
support is fed by the increased level of Insurgent Activities.  The coalition responds by 
targeting the Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms, and the availability of resources, 
which balance the insurgent’s unity and capacity to conduct operations.  These influences 
are shown in the influence diagram in Figure 31.   
 
77 
 
 
Figure 31: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model showing influences of 
Insurgent Activities. 
 
Two more sets of Compensating Loops can now be identified in the influence diagram 
and originate from Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Capacity, but they 
have very different effects on the system.  The first loop is formed by Coalition Combat 
Operations and it functions in much the same manner as the previous loop in which this 
element was involved.  This time the target of the security forces is not the insurgency 
directly, but their access to Internal Resources.  This influence causes a reduction in 
Insurgent Organization Mechanisms and Insurgent Activities, which result in a lower 
need for continued combat support.  Another element that influences the availability of 
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Internal Resources is Host Nation Capacity, which is the other element that generates a 
Compensating Loop.  In this case, as the local government’s capacity increases the host 
nation is able to produce more resources and, as an unintended consequence, make more 
resources available to the insurgency.  Even though the government also strives to make 
sure these resources are distributed appropriately, it is not likely that the total available 
resources would increase without a proportionate increase in resources going to the 
insurgency.  This causes a strengthening in the insurgent’s leadership structure and 
activities and a reduction in Host Nation Capacity.  These influences are shown in the 
diagram in Figure 32.   
 
Figure 32: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model showing influences of 
Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Capacity. 
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Finally, the reinforcing influences of Information Operations, which reinforce the Host 
Nation’s Capacity for growth and reduce the availability of Internal Resources, and the 
controls of Coalition Investment are added to the model.  Like in the previous model, 
Coalition Investment is essential to feeding the counterinsurgency assets: Coalition 
Combat Operations, Information Operations, and Host Nation Capacity.  The element 
that guides Coalition Investment and adjusts its overall contribution to the campaign is 
Population Behavior.  Population Behavior was chosen as the indicator that guides 
coalition resources because it provides a more accurate picture of the state of the local 
government.  The goals of the counterinsurgency are to obtain security and stability in a 
country (Nagl, 2002).  Population Behavior accounts for actions such as participating in 
local elections and sending the children to school.  If the security portion of this mission 
is not accomplished, then the people will be afraid of being affiliated with the local 
government or of letting their children leave their homes.  But the opposite is not 
necessarily correct.  Just because the region is secure, as measured by low Insurgent 
Activities, this does not mean that the government is capable of governing its population.  
Thus the behavior of the locals is the better indicator that both the security and stability 
portions of the counterinsurgency mission have been achieved.   
 With the addition of the final elements and their effects on the system, the 
influence diagram for Cost Benefit Theory is fully developed (Figure 33) and the process 
can proceed to building the flow diagram.   
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Figure 33: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model. 
 
Flow Diagrams of the Cost Benefit Theory Model 
As before, establishing the flow diagram parameters for this model is the first step in this 
phase of the process.  In order to maintain standard simulation parameter that will help in 
comparing this model to the Hearts and Minds model, the timeline has been maintained 
as before.  Similarly, all of the factors that establish the model’s behavior will be 
determined by using the same procedures.   
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 The first element that will be developed into the flow diagram is Population 
Behavior.  As previously discussed, the behavior of this element is very similar to that of 
Popular Support from the Hearts and Minds model.  The Draining Structure’s behavior is 
controlled, as seen before by a flow coefficient, the Pop Behavior Drain Factor.  The 
behavior pattern and flow diagram for Population Behavior are shown in Figure 34.   
 
Figure 34: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Population Behavior 
element in the Cost Benefit Theory model. 
 
The next structure that will be evaluated is the Stock Adjustment Structure of Insurgent 
Activities.  When this element was developed during the influence diagram phase of the 
process, the model was able to capture its behavior and describe it independently of any 
other factor.  When this model is operationalized, the introduction of the influence from 
Insurgent Operational Mechanisms is key; much the same way that Coalition Investment 
was introduced into the individual flow diagrams for several factors of the Hearts and 
Minds model.  In this case, two factors control the rate of growth and maximum value of 
the element’s behavior; one for the drain and the other for the gain associated with 
Insurgent Operational Mechanisms.  The value of both of these factors was determined to 
be 0.1.  This allows both constraints to meet the standards of simplicity in the 
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development and provide the expected behavior, which is shown along with the flow 
diagram in Figure 35.   
 
Figure 35: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Insurgent Activities 
element in the Cost Benefit Theory model. 
 
The other two natural behaviors that will be discussed in this section are those of 
Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Capacity.  As explained before, both of 
these elements exhibit the same behavior pattern, S-Shaped Structure, but differ in their 
basic construction.  One, Coalition Combat Operations, is adjusted by a compensating 
force on its draining loop, and the other on its gaining flow.  Figure 36 and Figure 37 
demonstrate the differences in the construction of these flow diagrams and the similar 
behavior patterns of each.   
 
Figure 36: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Combat Support element 
in the Cost Benefit Theory model. 
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Figure 37: Flow Diagram and graph of emergent behavior of Host Nation Capacity 
element in the Cost Benefit Theory model. 
 
The procedure for connecting the individual flow diagrams following the influences 
identified in the influence diagram proceeds as with the previous model.  The process 
incrementally connects the individual elements and compares their emergent behavior to 
expected outcomes based on the logic of their influences and the experience of the 
modeler.  Figure 38 shows the fully developed flow diagram for this model and Table 5 
summarizes the names, values, and units of the coefficients used during the model’s 
development.   
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Figure 38: Flow Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model. 
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Table 5: Names, values, and units of coefficients used in the development of the Cost 
Benefit Theory model Flow Diagram. 
 
 
Results and Discussion of Cost Benefit Theory Model Simulation  
At this point, without focusing on the results of the simulation, several observations can 
be made from the model’s construction.  First, by looking at the number of influences and 
their nature, the elements of major importance to this system can be quickly identified: 
Coefficient Name Coefficient Value Coefficient Units 
Pop Behavior Drain Factor 0.005 1/month 
Combat Support Gaining Factor 0.0002  
x = Insurgent Activities 
1/(Coalition Investment*month) 
Combat Support Compounding Factor 0.0016  
x = Combat Support 
1/month 
Insurgent Acts Loss Factor 0.1 1/month 
Capacity Compounding Factor 0.0004  
x = Host Nation Capacity 
1/(Coalition Investment*month) 
Capacity Draining Factor 0.031 1/(Insurgent Activities*month) 
Pop Behavior Insurgent Acts Factor 0.02  
x = Insurgent Activities 
Population Behavior/month 
Pop Behavior HN Capacity Factor 0.015  
x = Host Nation Capacity 
Population Behavior/month 
Pop Behavior CI Factor 0.05 
Coalition Investment/(Population 
Behavior/month) 
Insurgent Acts IOM Factor 0.1 
Insurgent Activities/(Insurgent 
Organizational Mechanisms*month) 
HN Capacity Info Ops Factor 0.1  
x = Information Operations 
Host Nation Capacity/month 
Draining HN Capacity due to Insurgent 
Acts Factor 
0.04 1 
x = Insurgent Activities 
Insurgent Activities 
Resource Insurgent Acts Factor 0.015  
x = Insurgent Activities 
Resources/month 
Resource HN Capacity Factor 0.01  
x = Host Nation Capacity 
Resources/month 
Resource Combat Support Factor 0.02  
x = Combat Support 
Resources/month 
Resource Info Ops Factor 0.04  
x = Information Operations 
Resources/month 
IOM Info Ops Factor 0.01  
x = Information Operations 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms/month 
IOM Pop Behavior Factor 0.005  
x = Population Behavior 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms/month 
IOM Combat Support Factor 0.02  
x = Combat Support 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms/month 
IOM Int Resources Factor 0.005  
x = Internal Resources 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms/month 
IOM Ext Resources Factor 0.005 
Insurgent Organizational 
Mechanisms/(Resources*month) 
Info Ops Pop Behavior Factor 0.005  
x = Population Behavior 
Information Operations/month 
Info Ops CI Factor 0.0225 
Information Operations/(Coalition 
Investment*month) 
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Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and Internal and External Resources.  Insurgent 
Organizational Mechanisms possesses the majority of the influences that are directly tied 
to Coalition Investment (Coalition Combat Support and Information Operations).  It also 
relies on a number of elements to provide fuel for its growth.   The fact that this 
organizational structure, and not the operations conducted by the insurgency, is the target 
of interest in this strategy represents a drastic shift from the mentality of Hearts and 
Minds.  The previous model did not contain any elements that directly focused on 
insurgent force structures or that was guided by their activities; it relied on Popular 
Support to be both the target of the coalition and the local government and their indicator 
for progress.  By focusing on the insurgents directly, in military and political terms, then 
a new opportunity for expanding the natural bounds of this system emerges.  Another 
factor of interest with regard to Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms is its reliance on 
Internal and External Resources for continued growth.  
 The identification of the resources that provide for the insurgency in Cost Benefit 
Theory is another aspect that sets it apart from the previous model.  While one of the 
objectives of increasing the Host Nation’s Capacity is to be able to produce more for the 
citizenry, the insight this flow diagram provides allows policy makers to also view these 
resources as instrumental to the insurgency.  Internal Resources, in particular, are of 
interest to the counterinsurgents because of their ability to secure its generation and 
control distribution so it is less likely to fall into the hands of the insurgency.  As some 
have recently stipulated (Long, 2006; Nagl, 2008), a counterinsurgency rests on the 
ability to cut off the insurgents from resources across national borders.  Thus, the 
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External Resources’ contributions, with adequate combat support and improving 
technology, could be reduced to the point its effects are negligible when compared to the 
overall effects of a single Resource element.   
 The final comment about the construction of this model is directed to the 
generalized element of Host Nation Capacity.  This model component is intended to 
encompass the local government’s ability to manage the country, much in the same way 
that Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms manage the insurgency.  The Host Nation 
Capacity element, which is fed by Coalition Investment, conducts the governmental, 
economic, and infrastructure tasks that are broken out into individual elements in the 
Hearts and Minds model.  It may then seem logical to question the reasoning behind 
Hearts and Minds focus on these elements as individuals rather than dedicating its 
resources to the principal of sound governance through a single, measurable stock.   
 Even though these observations help to provide insight into the system, the 
simulation of the model and the information gained from its emergent behaviors solidify 
the theory’s contributions.  As before, this model is designed to be adjustable to a wide 
range of study variables.  But, the purpose of this research remains the development of 
counterinsurgency strategy from this and the previous model and not the employment of 
these models towards test scenarios.  The simulations that will be discussed serve the 
purpose of testing the model’s effectiveness and validity.   
 The first graph describing the emergent behavior of the system is shown in Figure 
39.  This behavior pattern establishes a baseline for comparing the remaining scenarios 
and, as before, does not represent current doctrine nor is intended to characterize optimal 
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behavior.  The graph demonstrates that Population Behavior and Host Nation Capacity 
both grow throughout the length of the simulation.  As before, positive and growing 
behavior is the desired outcome of this model and not a particular value along the scale.  
The growth of these elements is attributed to the steady contribution of Coalition 
Investment as Population Behavior is still growing and to the heavy contribution of 
Combat Support.  Structurally this model differs from the development of the Hearts and 
Minds model in that the security component is able to complete its objectives (mitigating 
insurgent leadership and forces structures) without facing resistance by the people (in the 
form of Feelings of Resentment).  Since Cost Benefit Theory refuses to allocate resources 
to immeasurable indicators, such as Resentment, this model continues to stand as a valid 
indicator of the theory’s intentions, but may not be practical in terms of execution 
because Hearts and Minds proves to be an excellent justification for accounting for these 
emotions.   
 
Figure 39: Emergent Behavior of Cost Benefit Theory given even allocation of Coalition 
Investment to Combat Support, Host Nation Capacity, and Information Operations. 
 
(1) Population Behavior in favor 
of Host Nation 
(2) Host Nation Capacity 
(3) Insurgent Activities
(4) Combat Support
(5) Coalition Investment 
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Further understanding of the dynamics of the system comes from observing the behavior 
when Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964) is simulated.  During this simulation of the Hearts 
and Minds model, this scenario proved to be an improvement to the equally distributed 
allocation of resources.  This was due to the adverse effects that are present from the 
influence of Resentment on Coalition Combat Operations.  In the Cost Benefit Theory 
model these effects are not present and thus security plays a much more important role.  
It is then expected that reducing the percentage of Coalition Investment allocated to 
security from 33 percent to 20 percent will result in a less satisfactory outcome in terms 
of the growth or Population Behavior and the reduction of Insurgent Activities.  These 
effects are demonstrated by the emergent behavior pattern shown in Figure 40.   
 
Figure 40: Emergent Behavior of Cost Benefit Theory model given allocation of 
Coalition Investment following Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964): 20% to Combat Support 
and 80% equally distributed to Host Nation Capacity, and Information Operations. 
 
Another demonstration of the model’s reaction to shifting resources away from security is 
seen by simulating a strategy focused on building Host Nation Capacity.  It would be 
(1) Population Behavior in favor 
of Host Nation 
(2) Host Nation Capacity 
(3) Insurgent Activities
(4) Combat Support
(5) Coalition Investment 
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logical to assume that since this element is a clear indicator of the strength of the 
government, then focusing on this element’s development would yield more positive 
results.  The problem with this logic again lies with the construction of the model and its 
focus on Coalition Combat Operations.  When this situation is simulated, the behavior 
appears to respond well in the short term; Host Nation Capacity increases dramatically 
even though Population Behavior does not respond as rapidly as before.  But as the 
simulation progresses into the mid- and long-term, the effects of not investing in adequate 
security forces becomes apparent as Insurgent Activities rapidly increase and work to 
keep Population Behavior low and slowly diminish the efforts of Host Nation Capacity.  
This behavior is shown on the plot of Figure 41. 
 
Figure 41: Emergent Behavior of Cost Benefit Theory given allocation of Coalition 
Investment following Host Nation Capacity-focused strategy: 60% to Host Nation 
Capacity and 40% equally to Combat Support, and Information Operations. 
 
The development of this model, along with the information gained from its construction 
and simulation, provide a wealth of knowledge that will serve to create a comprehensive 
(1) Population Behavior in favor 
of Host Nation 
(2) Host Nation Capacity 
(3) Insurgent Activities
(4) Combat Support
(5) Coalition Investment 
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counterinsurgency strategy model that incorporates the lessons of the two observed 
theories.  The next sections of this research will explore the elements that will make the 
greatest contributions to this Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy, the influences that will 
dictate its behavior, and the construction of its basic components.    
 
Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy Model 
The goal of establishing a Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy based on the lessons from 
Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit Theory is to incorporate the most influential elements 
and the soundest reasoning from each of the contrasting models in order to gain a better 
perspective on the dynamics of this system.  In accomplishing this task, the process for 
developing the System Dynamics model will proceed in the same manner as with the 
previous models.  Several steps will not be described in great detail because they will be 
repetitive of the tasks that have already been performed; such as determining and 
describing the natural behaviors of the elements.   
 The first step is to determine which elements will meaningfully contribute to the 
validity of the model.  Since, to this researcher’s knowledge, there is no precedent in the 
System Dynamics arena for developing a hybrid structure based on two distinct system 
models, this process will be preceded by evaluating several options for completing this 
task.  One approach that can be considered is to determine which elements fail to 
contribute to their model’s dynamics and exclude them from the new environment.  It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to make a reasonable case for dismissing the effects on any of 
the elements from their respective models.  Another is to identify similar elements that 
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may be interchanged between the models and use these elements as the bridge that 
combines the two models.  In this case, Popular Support and Population Behavior are 
excellent examples of very similar elements that could effectively serve as a link between 
the two models.  But, if this approach were taken, then other similar elements would 
coexist within the same boundary.  After considering these options, a subtle modification 
to the latter alternative will be implemented for combining these models.   
First, similar elements are selected from each of the models and considered for 
either direct substitution or aggregation.  In the case of Popular Support and Population 
Behavior, the exchange can occur directly.  For Coalition Combat Operations, the debate 
over its transition and combination is complex.  Because System Dynamics seeks to 
achieve greater levels of aggregation in a model, the choice of accepting the construction 
of this element as designed for the Cost Benefit Theory model would appear to be more 
desirable.  But, the justification that Hearts and Minds advocates provide about the value 
of Host Nation Security Forces is far too influential to dismiss.  Thus, in this case, the 
less aggregated oscillating security element from Hearts and Minds is favored.  On the 
other hand, the case for aggregation proves to be more formidable when considering 
maintaining Host Nation Capacity as a reasonable substitute for the Essential Services, 
Host Nation Economy, and Governance components.  During the development of the 
Hearts and Minds model, these three elements showed identical natural behaviors, very 
similar influences, and no noticeable divergence in their emergent behavior patterns when 
they were simulated.   
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The remaining elements that will form the structure for the new model are the 
ones that are common to both systems (Coalition Investment and Information 
Operations) and those that were specific to each theory.  The relationship between 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and the indicators that drove the Cost Benefit 
Theory (Population Behavior and Insurgent Activities) proved to be of unexpected value 
to the discussion of counterinsurgency dynamics.  Typically Hearts and Minds 
proponents stay away from suggesting the importance of directly targeting insurgent 
structures because they favor the political and stabilization factors of the strategy.  But 
their reluctance to grant this factor the value it deserves is not justification enough to 
exclude its effectiveness.  With this stated, an element identified by the Hearts and Minds 
model that balances an overemphasis on military solutions will also be required for 
building the combined model.  The Resentment element will help mitigate this tendency 
by its negative influence on Popular Support when the coalition military level rises to 
greater levels.  Finally, the last element that will be incorporated into the Hybrid 
Counterinsurgency Strategy model will be the Resources Available to the Insurgency.   
Originally this element was divided into two separate factors; internal and external.  But, 
as described before, further development of surveillance and information technology and 
a focus on border security can negate the proportion of resources that are outside of the 
counterinsurgents ability to control and thus it is more reasonable to treat these elements 
as a single factor with equal influences.  A summary of the elements that have been 
discussed are shown with their natural behaviors in Table 6 and as independent 
influences structures in Figure 42.   
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Table 6: Elements and Natural Behaviors of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model.  
Model Element  Reference Mode 
Popular Support 1st Order Draining 
Coalition Combat Operations Oscillation 
Host Nation Security Forces Oscillation 
Host Nation Capacity S‐Shaped
Insurgent Activities Stock Adjustment – Approach to Steady 
State  
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms No Natural Behavior 
Coalition Investment No Natural Behavior 
Information Operations No Natural Behavior 
Resentment No Natural Behavior 
Resources  No Natural Behavior 
  
 
 
Figure 42: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model showing 
independent influence structures of individual elements. 
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The first influences that will be identified and added to the influence diagram are those of 
Popular Support.  The Reinforcing Loops that influence Popular Support’s relationships 
with Host Nation Security Forces and Resentment are that same as described in the 
Hearts and Minds model.  Similarly, the influence loops created between Popular 
Support and Host Nation Capacity mimics the connections with the Services, Economy, 
and Governance element that this factor replaces.  Also, there exists another Reinforcing 
Loop between Popular Support and Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms that is 
mediated through Insurgent Activities.  This influence is the same as the one described in 
the Cost Benefit Theory model involving Population Behavior.  These influences are 
shown in Figure 43. 
 
Figure 43: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model showing 
influences of Popular Support. 
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The next influences considered are those that relate to Coalition Combat Operations.  
This element forms two Compensating Loops with Insurgent Organizational 
Mechanisms and Resources and a Reinforcing Loop with Resentment.  The 
Compensating Loops are both mediated through Insurgent Activities; reducing Insurgent 
Organizational Mechanisms and Resources available will work to decrease the amount of 
Insurgent Activities and reduce the need for security operations.  The Resentment loop is 
part of the Popular Support influence loop that affects the level of Host Nation Security 
Forces and the coalition’s requirement to train and augment more local forces.  These 
influences are shown in Figure 44. 
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Figure 44: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model showing 
influences of Coalition Combat Operations. 
 
Information Operations, for its part, influences the system by adding four more 
Reinforcing Loops that help to bolster the Host Nation Capacity and Popular Support 
and attempts to reduce Feelings of Resentment and Resources Available to the 
Insurgency.  These influences are highlighted in Figure 45. 
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Figure 45: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model showing 
influences of Information Operations. 
 
The final sources of influence originate from the effects of Coalition Investment and Host 
Nation Capacity.  Both of these elements generate resources that control the progress of 
the counterinsurgency.  Coalition Investment, as seen before, feeds the Coalition Combat 
Support, Information Operations, and Host Nation Capacity elements.  Host Nation 
Capacity is responsible for providing resources for conducting training of local military 
and law enforcement.  This influence is of importance because it indicates that when 
Coalition Investment decreases due to rising Popular Support, the training is not 
stagnated because of decreased levels of coalition troops.  The completed influence 
diagram of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model can be seen in Figure 46.   
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Figure 46: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model. 
 
These elements are now operationalized into the simulation software, STELLA 9, and 
converted into flow diagrams.  First, the reference mode diagrams of the individual 
elements are modeled independent of the system influences and then incremental 
relationships are added and tested until the completed system is developed.  Figure 47 
through Figure 50 demonstrate the flow diagrams and behavior patterns of the Coalition 
Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces, Popular Support, Host Nation 
Capacity, and Insurgent Activities elements.   
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Figure 47: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Coalition Combat 
Operations and Host Nation Security Forces element in the Hybrid Counterinsurgency 
Strategy model. 
 
 
Figure 48: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Popular Support element 
in the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model. 
 
 
Figure 49: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of Host Nation Capacity element 
in the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model. 
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Figure 50: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of Insurgent Activities element in 
the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model. 
 
The construction of the flow diagram progresses by incrementally adding the influences 
of the individual elements in the same manner as they were identified during the 
development of the influence diagram.  The complete construction of the flow diagram of 
the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model depicts all of the influences identified 
during the model’s development.  This diagram can is shown in Figure 51.  Table 7 also 
summarizes the names, values, and units of the coefficients that were used to develop the 
Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model.   
 
 
102 
 
 
Figure 51: Flow Diagram of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model. 
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Table 7:  Names, values, and units of coefficients used in the development of the Hybrid 
Counterinsurgency Strategy model Flow Diagram 
 
 
Coefficient Name Coefficient Value Coefficient Units 
Popular Support Flow Factor 0.1 1/month 
Coalition Combat Support Compounding 
Factor 
0.025  
x = Percentage Coalition Investment to 
Security*Insurgent Activities 
Coalition Combat Support/month 
Coalition Combat Support Draining 
Factor 
0.19 
Coalition Combat Support/(Host Nation 
Security Forces*month) 
HN Security Forces Compounding Factor 0.005  
x = Host Nation Security Forces 
Host Nation Security Forces/(Coalition 
Combat Operations*month) 
HN Security Forces Draining Factor 
0.0033 0 
0.0012 0 
x = Popular Support 
1/month 
Capacity Compounding Factor 0.00064  
x = Host Nation Capacity 
1/(Coalition Investment*month) 
Capacity Draining Factor 0.049 1/month 
Insurgent Acts Loss Factor 0.1 1/month 
Insurgent Acts IOM Factor 0.1 
Insurgent Activities/(Insurgent 
Organizational Mechanism*month) 
Support Security Factor 0.05  
x = Host Nation Security Forces 
Popular Support/month 
Support Capacity Factor 0.05  
x = Host Nation Capacity 
Popular Support/month 
Support Insurgency Factor 0.06 1 
x = Insurgent Activities 
Popular Support/month 
Support Resentment Factor 0.06 1 
x = Feelings of Resentment 
Popular Support/month 
Support Info Ops Factor 0.05  
x = Information Operations 
Popular Support/month 
HN Security Capacity Factor 0.05  
x = Host Nation Capacity 
Host Nation Security Forces/month 
Info Ops CI  Factor 
0.015  
x = Percentage Coalition Investment to 
Information Operations 
Information Operations/month 
Info Ops Support Factor 0.005  
x = Popular Support 
Information Operations/month 
Info Ops Capacity Factor 0.005  
x = Host Nation Capacity 
Information Operations/month 
Support Coalition Investment Factor 0.002 
Coalition Investment/(Popular 
Support*month) 
Capacity Info Ops Factor 0.05  
x = Information Operations 
Host Nation Capacity/month 
Capacity Support Factor 0.05  
x = Popular Support 
Host Nation Capacity/month 
Capacity Insurgent Act Factor 0.05  
x = Insurgent Activities 
Host Nation Capacity/month 
Resentment Info Ops Factor 0.05  
x = Information Operations 
Feelings of Resentment/month 
Resentment Support Factor 0.025  
x = Popular Support 
Feelings of Resentment/month 
Resentment Security Factor 0.16 6 
x = Coalition Combat Operations 
Feelings of Resentment/month 
Resources Combat Ops Factor 0.01  
x = Coalition Combat Operations 
Resources/month 
Resources Info Ops Factor 0.005  
x = Information Operations 
Resources/month 
Resources Capacity Factor 0.0025  
x = Host Nation Capacity 
Resources/month 
Resources Insurgent Act Factor 0.01  
x = Insurgent Activities 
Resources/month 
IOM Support Factor 0.025  
x = Popular Support 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanism/month 
IOM Security Factor 0.005  
x = Coalition Combat Operations 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanism/month 
IOM Resources Factor 0.02  
x = Resources 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanism/month 
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Results and Discussion of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy Model Simulation  
From the model’s construction it is apparent that the goal of this strategy is to incorporate 
all of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency into the most robust definition of 
doctrine possible.  The combination of elements from Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit 
Theory provides a noticeable difference in the model’s structure; more influences exist 
among a wider range of elements than in the previous models.  This leads to a more 
balanced approach to counterinsurgency, where even radical shifts in focus of Coalition 
Investment would still be expected to yield similar behaviors.  This expectation is 
supported by observing the emergent behavior patterns from the model’s simulation.  The 
first simulation, Figure 52, demonstrates that standard allocation of coalition resources 
evenly among Coalition Combat Operations, Host Nation Capacity, and Information 
Operations.    
 
Figure 52: Emergent Behavior of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy given even 
allocation of Coalition Investment to Coalition Combat Operations, Host Nation 
Capacity, and Information Operations. 
 
(1) Popular Support for Host Nation 
(2) Coalition Combat Operations
(3) Host Nation Security Forces
(4) Host Nation Capacity 
(5) Insurgent Activities 
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The plot of emergent behavior suggests promising results for the validity of the Hybrid 
Counterinsurgency Strategy.  The emergent behavior shows that Popular Support, after 
undergoing an expected initial decline, began to rise steadily after the initial stages.  This 
initial decrease is due to the high levels of Coalition Combat Operations that are present 
early and the Resentment that results from this initial surge.  The heightened focus on 
security operations early is critical to the development of two key elements.  First, this 
initial increase in foreign combat forces jumpstarts the Host Nation Security Forces 
training during the short-term phase and allows this local force to take over the security 
responsibilities over the mid- and long-term.  The other important aspect about the high 
initial spike in combat troops is to control the rise of Insurgent Activities by disrupting 
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and cutting off access to Resources.  Thus, the 
adverse effects of heightened Coalition Combat Operations (in the form of Resentment) 
are outweighed by the benefits of increased training and lower insurgent operations.  The 
other key component that this behavior demonstrates is the steady increase of Host 
Nation Capacity due to the balanced allocation of resources by the coalition and the 
multiplying effects that this element causes on the system: increasing Popular Support, 
Host Nation Security Forces, and the capability of Information Operations.   
 The next plot demonstrates the simulation of Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964) on the 
Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy.  The plot of the system’s behavior can be seen in 
Figure 53.  As described before, it is expected that reasonable changes to the resource 
allocation will have minimal effects on the outcome of the emergent behaviors patterns, 
even though the overall level of each elements seems to have been slightly reduced.  The 
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first plot (Figure 52) allocates 33 percent Coalition Investment to Coalition Combat 
Operations and yields a higher initial spike in combat troops and higher long-term level 
of Popular Support when compared to Figure 53.  
 
Figure 53: Emergent Behavior of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model given 
allocation of Coalition Investment following Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964): 20% to 
Combat Support and 80% equally to Host Nation Capacity, and Information Operations. 
 
A very interesting point surfaces from looking at these two plots.  The long-standing 
assumption presented by Galula suggests that the political component of 
counterinsurgency would be more influential than the military element.  But the 
simulation of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model proposes that this is not the 
case during the short-term where subduing the Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and 
limiting Insurgent Activities take priority.   
The question also remains as to what exactly is a reasonable change in resource 
allocation.  In the Hearts and Minds model, a study of resource allocation towards 
Coalition Combat Operations yielded that any percentage distribution greater the 25 
(1) Popular Support for Host Nation 
(2) Coalition Combat Operations
(3) Host Nation Security Forces
(4) Host Nation Capacity 
(5) Insurgent Activities 
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percent towards security would cause irreversible harm to the level of Popular Support.  
But, because of the nature of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy, this behavior is not 
expected.  As explained before, even through Feelings of Resentment are still present in 
this model, and have the same parameterized influence weights, the added influences of 
Coalition Combat Operations on Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and Resources 
insert new balance to the system. Thus, this model does not react adversely to increases 
in the allocation of resources to Coalition Combat Operations up to 75 percent.  Figure 
54 is a comparative plot that graphs Popular Support as Coalition Investment is adjusted 
from five to 75 percent towards Coalition Combat Operations.  Figure 55 shows the 
system behavior for a Coalition Investment of 55 percent towards Coalition Combat 
Operations.  These plots shows that the system is able to self-regulate its behavior; even 
though Coalition Combat Operations is vastly over-funded when compared to Host 
Nation Capacity and Information Operations, the value of the security element still 
reduces drastically after the short-term and is only present in relatively low quantities 
throughout the mid-term.  But, Popular Support and Host Nation Capacity are still able 
to rise considerably and Insurgent Activities are virtually eliminated by the end of the 
simulation.   
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Figure 54: Comparative Plot of the behavior of Popular Support in the Hybrid 
Counterinsurgency Strategy model given incrementally increasing allocation of Coalition 
Investment to Combat Operations.  The plot ranges from 5% to 75% allocation towards 
Combat Operations and the remainder is equally distributed to Host Nation Capacity, and 
Information Operations. 
 
Careful observation of the behaviors shown in Figure 54 provides insight into the balance 
between the military and political components that has been discusses throughout this 
section.  First, it is apparent that one behavior pattern in the plot, the one pertaining to 
five percent allocation of Coalition Investment to Coalition Combat Operations, does not 
follow the same trace as the others.  This is explained by the growth of Insurgent 
Activities that drives down Popular Support because enough Coalition Combat 
Operations are not working to limit the insurgent’s direct negative effects over the 
population.  But, even though this plot does not reach the same levels as the others in this 
graph, it still maintains positive values of Popular Support and positive growth.  This is 
attributed to the structure of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model that, in 
contrast to the other models, adjusts the need for Coalition Combat Operations based on 
multiple factors: Coalition Investment and Insurgent Activities.  What is essentially 
(1) 5% Coalition Investment to Security
(2) 15% Coalition Investment to Security
(3) 25% Coalition Investment to Security
(4) 35% Coalition Investment to Security
(5) 45% Coalition Investment to Security
(6) 55% Coalition Investment to Security
(7) 65% Coalition Investment to Security
(8) 75% Coalition Investment to Security
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occurring is that even though the initial planning requirements called for lower levels of 
combat troops, the heightened level of Insurgent Activities has triggered a redistribution 
of resources to introduce more troops as a response.  This introduction of coalition forces 
afterwards helps to eventually grow Popular Support, but the timeline is substantially 
delayed because of the initial miscalculation.   
 From the remaining plots in Figure 54 we can see that higher initial allocation of 
Coalition Investment towards Coalition Combat Operations causes a short-term decrease 
in Popular Support that is attributed to the emergence of Feelings of Resentment.  But, as 
was see in the Hearts and Minds model, these feelings are primarily mitigated by the 
introduction of effective Information Operations.  Also, those higher initial levels of 
combat troops lead to a quicker reduction of Insurgent Activities and prolonged growth of 
Host Nation Capacity and Popular Support during the mid- and long-term periods.   
 
 
Figure 55: Emergent Behavior of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy, given 
allocation of Coalition Investment following Security-focused strategy: 55% to Coalition 
Combat Operations and 45% equally to Host Nation Capacity and Information 
Operations. 
(1) Popular Support for Host Nation 
(2) Coalition Combat Operations
(3) Host Nation Security Forces
(4) Host Nation Capacity 
(5) Insurgent Activities 
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The results of these simulations and the observations gained from the construction of this 
and the other models provide a great addition to the body of counterinsurgency 
knowledge.  The next chapter will further discuss the findings and recommendations that 
can be derived from this study.  Furthermore, it proposes additional research areas that 
will serve to further this topic’s understanding.   
 
111 
 
V.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The models developed during this research add to the existing body of knowledge on 
counterinsurgency and contribute greatly to the information available to the policy 
makers tasked with our nation’s security.  This study has aggregated a wide depth and 
breadth of counterinsurgency lessons in order to generate models for two classic 
approaches: Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit Theory.  The methodology employed in 
generating the system models for these strategies provided insight into their structures 
and behavior that enabled the construction of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy 
model.  This new perspective on the issues of counterinsurgency combines Hearts and 
Minds’ focus on gaining support from the local population by emphasizing the political 
components of the fight, while incorporating the accountability principals from Cost 
Benefit Theory that center on eliminating resources that are useful to the insurgency and 
diminishing the benefits of their actions.  From this model, the elements of security, 
information superiority, and harvesting the local government’s capacity have come to the 
forefront as the most important attributes of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy.   
 It is equally important to note that this model serves only as a representation of 
the system’s behavior.  It is unreasonable for a decision maker to expect definitive 
timelines or values from this or any other System Dynamics model.  The true benefits of 
the model come from understanding the system’s construction and the influences that tie 
each of the model’s elements together; it is these influences that give the model its 
characteristic behavior and value. 
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 Many have proposed ways in which current counterinsurgency strategy can be 
improved; such as reorganizing the counterinsurgency force around the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team construct (Long, 2006), establishing permanent advisory specialties 
(Nagl, 2007), or utilizing a wide range of airpower assets more effectively (Dunlap, 
2007).   But, most seem to agree there is no “silver bullet” response to the 
counterinsurgency issue.  This research does not intend to be a definitive solution for 
counterinsurgency strategic planning or a tool to measure perceived support for a certain 
amount of investment.  Rather, the purpose of this discussion is to add to the knowledge 
that exists on counterinsurgency strategy and for each of the recommendations that have 
been derived from the study to be able to contribute to the decision making process.  The 
insight gained from the construction of these models, the identification of the system 
influences, and the emergent behavior patterns fulfill this goal.   
  
Security is Key 
The first section of recommendations will focus on the military component of the 
counterinsurgency fight.  Attempting to determine the most optimum relationship 
between this and the political elements has been highly debated throughout the history of 
counterinsurgency.  Revolutionaries and counterinsurgents alike have time and again 
made suggestions that seem to downplay the role of conventional military operations in 
the irregular environment (Galula, 1964; O’Neill, 2001).  This assumption has been 
continually promoted by current doctrine and demonstrated by ongoing operations (FM 
3-24, 2006).  But, as at least one war fighter’s example, suggests that these guidelines 
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may not always apply.  The case of the First Armored Division’s evolving mission during 
2007 serves as an excellent example of how these long-standing metrics may require a 
closer look.  This unit initially estimated that only 30 percent of their missions would 
involve combat operations and they entered Northern Iraq structured around this 
assumption.  But, as the fighting in the north began to intensify because of migration of 
insurgent forces from Baghdad and other former strongholds, the commanders shaped 
their force structure to meet these challenges (Shaker, 2009).   
  The example of the First Armored Division in Iraq underscores one of the 
recommendations that can be extracted from the development of the Hybrid 
Counterinsurgency Strategy.  While the Hearts and Minds model demonstrated that a 
combat-focused strategy would fail to gain the necessary popular support because of the 
emergence of resentment among the locals, the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy 
suggests that the long term implications of popular support are less dependent on the 
amount of security forces employed during an operation, but more so on the timeline 
associated with their deployment.  The Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model’s 
simulation proposes that combat forces employed during the short-term period provides 
the greatest effects on training host nation personnel for ongoing security and disrupting 
the insurgent’s organizational structures and availability to resources that will permit the 
growth of the local government’s capacity during the long-term.  This model, which was 
not developed by focusing on any particular conflict or range of operational conditions, 
mimics the “surge” conditions implemented in Iraq in early 2007 that have lead to 
improved security and stabilization efforts (Nagl, 2002; Downey, et al., 2008).  The 
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development of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model also suggests that security 
operations must be conducted by focusing on developing host nation security forces, and 
establishing and maintaining effective border security.   
 The Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy maintains the contribution of Baker’s 
(2006) initial development of the Hearts and Minds model that included resentment as the 
defining element that countered the balance that existed between popular support and the 
military and political elements.  This model takes that premise one step further and 
combines it with the theory that host nation security forces would not encourage the 
development of these feelings (Nagl, 2008).  The Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy 
advocates for a strong reliance on training host nation security forces in order to limit the 
effects of resentment on popular support and to aid in the building of host nation 
capacity.  Some have suggested that this can be best accomplished by reorganizing the 
military’s advisory role into a formal military specialty (Nagl, 2007), but with care to not 
tip the balance of power away from maintaining future force structure requirements for 
emerging conventional and irregular threats (Haddick, 2008).  Others have also 
advocated that this advisory mission is the ideal source of cross-service integration of 
expertise and assets into the joint counterinsurgency arsenal.  Kostelnik (2006) and 
Brown (2008) suggest that Air Force Security Force and Civil Engineers have specialized 
skill sets that have been de-emphasized by their Army and Marine Corp counterparts and 
that these would serve to greatly increase the training capability of host nation forces and 
the local government’s capabilities.   
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 Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy also suggests that an increased stance on 
border security is critical to limiting the resources that are available to the insurgency, 
and thus their ability to organize and conduct operations.  This element stems from the 
construction of the Cost Benefit Theory model and has also been advocated by other 
studies (Long, 2006).  This research suggests that insurgent organizational mechanisms 
depend on inputs from internal and external resource suppliers.  Even though some of the 
resources that can be made available to the insurgency come directly from the host nation 
or coalition in the form of aid intended for the population, the Hybrid Counterinsurgency 
Strategy model proposes that effective security combined with intelligence and 
information operations can substantially diminish the availability of local and foreign 
resources.  The topic of information operations opens the discussion into the next area of 
recommendations suggested by this study.   
 
Focus on Information  
Perhaps one of the most unexpected findings of this research was the importance of 
information operations on counterinsurgency systems.  Every strategy modeled 
maintained some influence from information operations, but the lack of literary and 
doctrinal focus on this element seemed to imply that very little weight has been given to 
its contribution.  Prior to 2006, with the publication of FM 3-24, none of the classic 
proponents or emerging strategies focused around maintaining a robust information 
operations structure.  But the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy proposes that 
information operations is the single most influential element in the counterinsurgency 
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system.  The model’s construction and simulations demonstrate information operations 
influences on reducing resentment, bolstering the effects of the local government’s 
capacity, enabling the limitation of resources available to the insurgency and projecting 
the reach of the host nation and coalition directly to the population in an effort to gain 
their support.  This element of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model relied 
heavily on the information obtained from constructing the Hearts and Minds model.  
Simulation from this initial development suggested that if a strategy lacked the inclusion 
of information operations, then the added investment going towards the security and 
capacity-building elements would not be enough to counteract the effects of the 
insurgency and the emergence of the population’s resentment.   
 Recently several perspectives on the value of information in counterinsurgency 
have begun to surface.  Steele (2006) suggested that information operations have recently 
come to the forefront of national strategic planning and that its contributions are 
especially critical to the development of early warning, peacekeeping, and stabilization 
and reconstruction.  He also advocated for the development of a National Information 
Council to serve at the same level as the National Security Council.  With regards to the 
specific contributions of information operations to counterinsurgency, Helmus (2007) 
proposed that the methods with which a campaign’s effectiveness is communicated to the 
population are just as important as the actions themselves.  This RAND study focuses on 
utilizing the current elements of information operations, such as public affairs and 
psychological operations, and applying the principles developed for business marketing 
by managing expectation, tailoring stabilization efforts to meet individual “customer” 
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needs, and obtaining feedback from the population in order to measure the 
counterinsurgency’s effectiveness.  When marketing security, reconstruction, and 
stabilization, like in marketing for a business, the information disseminated must be 
factual and valuable to the audience.  
 
Build Capacity 
An unknown author said: “Give a man a fish; you have fed him for today.  Teach a man 
to fish; and you have fed him for a lifetime.”  Building the host nation's capability is not 
about introducing humanitarian assistance and investing in new buildings or 
infrastructure for the sake of spending money towards reconstruction.  This factor, as 
designed into the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model, originates from the 
individual focuses from Hearts and Minds on reestablishing essential services, stabilizing 
the host nation's economy, and gaining legitimacy for the government.   This broad area 
must be addressed by a multifaceted approach that addresses the individual needs of each 
component (Thompson, 1970).  Referring back to the fishing proverb, it can now be said 
that: “Build a school during a counterinsurgency and it will be attacked.  Teach the 
community how to build that school and they will have it for a lifetime.” 
 This statement underscores two points that are addressed by the Hybrid 
Counterinsurgency Strategy.  First, the model suggests that more influence is given to 
popular support when the investment comes in the form of action by the host nation's 
government rather than the foreign coalition's support.  As discussed before, the elements 
of host nation security forces and local government's capacity directly influence positive 
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growth of popular support, whereas the coalition's combat involvement may diminish 
support as a consequence of increasing feelings of resentment.  Also, information 
operations work to directly influence support from the population but requires input from 
the host nation's actions in order to spread the word of stabilization and progress.  
Second, there exists a sense of accomplishment and pride when the work is completed by 
the merits and hard work of the population itself.  This factor, which is seldom accounted 
for in studies and strategies, contributes to the capacity of the host nation.   
 Another issue that has recently been discussed and also falls under the category of 
building capacity is the diplomatic effort that must be present throughout the 
counterinsurgency campaign.  Typically strategists do not consider this to be a military 
role, but one better suited for civilian diplomats.  But this assumption may require serious 
reconsidering.  Long (2006) suggested that amnesty and reward programs directed at 
employing former insurgents to work for the host nation government should become an 
integral part of irregular warfare planning.  He warned that a prolonged battle of attrition 
would be counterproductive to the overall efforts of the counterinsurgency.  He also 
suggested that reward programs target information gathering that can lead to the capture 
of insurgents, bomb-makers, and criminals.  The effects would again institute a certain 
level of pride in the population that their efforts are contributing to the stabilization of 
their country while being supplemented by a monetary reward.  Along with the rapid 
increase in troop levels in Iraq that occurred in 2007, the commanders also instituted a 
limited amnesty program that brought former militants under the influence of the local 
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government for an investment of approximately ten dollars per day and created 
essentially a “neighborhood watch on steroids.” (Nagl, 2008)  
 
Suggested Future Research 
Throughout the development of these models, the goal has been to simulate the model 
behaviors in order to understand their construction and determine their emergent behavior 
patterns.  This processes served to achieve the objectives of this research: to consolidate 
counterinsurgency knowledge, to then use that knowledge in developing the models of 
current strategies, and finally to develop a comprehensive hybrid strategy with the insight 
gained from the prior models’ influences and behaviors.  One recommendation to further 
the counterinsurgency body of knowledge would be to apply these models, particularly 
the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model, towards historical or notional examples of 
a counterinsurgency operation in order to obtain an optimal allocation of resources or to 
determine the preferred investment allocation balance according the short-, mid-, and 
long-term phases.  This type of experimentation with the model’s functionality would 
also lend itself to multidimensional analysis of the model’s investment allocation 
elements.  Another application of this research is to conduct a budgetary analysis of 
resources to add to the information that will determine investment allocation, operational 
phasing timelines, and the rate of investment withdrawal in response to improving 
conditions. 
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Conclusion 
The initial discussion about the counterinsurgency body of knowledge included one 
author’s approximation on the enhanced attention that the study of counterinsurgency has 
received as of late.  The introduction stated that Dr. David Kilcullen, a senior 
counterinsurgency advisor for the US Department of State, estimates that more has been 
written on the topic of counterinsurgency in the last four years than in the previous 40.  
But the questions still remains unanswered: Why, even with all that has been 
documented, are we still struggling to understand this type of warfare?  In developing this 
research, one line of reasoning that helps to address that question has emerged.  Perhaps 
the lack of understanding has not been due to the lack of study, but to the way that the 
vast majority have sought to analyze the problem.   
 This research approaches the study of counterinsurgency from a drastically 
different point of view.  Whereas most studies and references have focused on case 
examples or have attempted to develop predictive models from past conflicts in order to 
suggest what approach can be taken in another.  In the case of this research, System 
Dynamics has allowed this study to focus on the mechanics of counterinsurgencies as 
complex social systems that have demonstrated consistent behavior patterns and 
influences at the structural and elemental levels that are not dependent on the particular 
conflict or geographic region.  This research provides a critical step forward in the 
prolonged understanding of irregular warfare and serves as a key contribution to the 
wealth of counterinsurgency knowledge.   
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Appendix A: Equations for Flow Diagram of Hearts and Minds Model 
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Appendix B: Equations for Flow Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory Model 
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Appendix C: Equations for Flow Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy 
Model 
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